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Abstract
Three Essays on the Economics of Fisheries Management
Rebecca Ellen Toseland
Problems arising from the common-pool nature of fisheries are well known
(Gordon 1954). Recent research estimates the lost economic benefits from subop-
timal fisheries production to be on the order of $50 billion annually (Arnason et al.
2009). Among the most promising management tools for improving fisheries per-
formance are closed areas (marine reserves) and rights-based management (catch
shares) (Worm et al. 2009). This collection of essays examines the emergence and
performance of these two policy tools from an economics perspective.
The first chapter examines the determinants of the transition from command
and control regulation to rights-based management in common-pool resources.
I develop a conceptual framework describing a regulator’s decision to adopt a
rights-based management regime in a common-pool resource and empirically test
the hypotheses advanced in the framework with a duration analysis of rights-based
management program adoption in a group of federally managed Alaska fisheries.
Consistent with the conceptual framework, I find that rent dissipation along input
cost and product value dimensions increases likelihood of program adoption, and
high transaction costs decrease likelihood of program adoption. I find mixed
evidence that resource depletion increases probability of program adoption.
x
The second chapter examines the capacity of marine reserves to function as a
cooperation mechanism in transboundary fisheries, stocks shared by two or more
jurisdictions. Using a game theoretic model, we find that marine reserve imple-
mentation can achieve first-best equilibrium economic outcomes. We illustrate
our theoretical predictions with a case study of the Chilean loco fishery.
The third chapter estimates the economic and biological outcomes of the imple-
mentation of a marine reserve network at the California Channel Islands in 2003 on
the Santa Barbara Area red sea urchin fishery. The paper develops an integrated
bioeconomic model of the fishery consisting of an age structured population model
and a discrete choice model of fishermen behavior linked via the fishing mortality
rate. We calibrate the model using a 15-year panel dataset of fishery data and
use the calibrated model to simulate outcomes under a counterfactual no-reserve
scenario. We find that eight years after reserve implementation, urchin biomass
is 53.7% higher, fishery yield is 11.3% lower, and fishery revenue is 10.9% lower
compared to simulated outcomes under a counterfactual no-reserve policy.
Professor Christopher Costello
Dissertation Committee Chair
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Chapter 1
Transition to Property Rights in
Common-Pool Resources:
Evidence from Alaska Fisheries
1.1 Introduction
Economists have long recognized that competition for common-pool resources
results in rent dissipation, and that this “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 1968)
can be mitigated by the assignment of clearly defined property rights to the
resource (Gordon 1954).1 Nevertheless, the extent to which common-pool losses
have been mitigated varies widely (Dietz et al. 2003). This paper expands our
understanding of common-pool resource governance by delineating the determi-
1This work was funded by the Pacific Fisheries Information Network, the NOAA Alaska
Fisheries Science Center (AFSC), and the Property and Environment Research Center (PERC). I
acknowledge generous data and research support from Ron Felthoven, Ben Fissel, Brian Garber-
Yonts, and other staff members at the AFSC Economic and Social Sciences Research Program
and Kristen Green and Kamala Carroll at the Alaska Department of Fish and Game. I also thank
Joshua Abbott, Christopher Costello, Sam Cunningham, Robert Deacon, Jane DiCosimo, Gary
Libecap, Doug Steigerwald, Wally Thurman, and the UCSB Econometrics Research Group.
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nants of (property) rights-based management adoption in common-pool resources
and applying the resulting framework to a marine fisheries empirical application.
The paper makes two principal contributions. First, I advance a conceptual
framework of a regulator’s decision to adopt a rights-based management program,
a system in which exclusive rights to a resource are allocated among individuals
or groups of resource users. The framework draws from existing literature on
the evolution of management institutions in common-pool resources, which places
institutional transition in a cost-benefit context, but my approach more precisely
defines the relevant costs and benefits and introduces empirically testable hy-
potheses about rights-based management adoption. Second, I empirically test
the conceptual framework hypotheses with a duration analysis of rights-based
management program adoption using a panel dataset of federally managed Alaska
fisheries. Consistent with the conceptual framework, I find that rent dissipa-
tion arising from inefficient production under command and control regulation
increases the likelihood of rights-based management program adoption, and the
presence of high transaction costs decreases the likelihood of adoption. Finally, I
find mixed evidence that resource depletion increases the probability of transition
to rights-based management.
A substantial body of empirical research addresses the performance of property
rights institutions in common-pool resources. This research generally finds that
2
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well-designed and enforced property rights can substantially mitigate common-
pool externalities relative to weak or insecure rights. For example, Hornbeck
(2010) finds increases in land value and agricultural productivity among land
owners on the American Plains in the late nineteenth century following the intro-
duction and near-universal adoption of barbed wire, which allowed land owners
to demarcate and enforce their land rights. Similarly, Goldstein and Udry (2008)
show that individuals with more secure land tenure rights invest more in land
fertility and have substantially higher agricultural output.2 Bohn and Deacon
(2000) find that insecure property rights increase rates of deforestation worldwide.3
Pfeiffer and Lin (2012) empirically quantify losses from spatial externalities in a
shared groundwater aquifer and show that these losses are internalized in cases
where water rights are allocated at a spatial level that prevents competition among
users for resource rents. Finally, Grafton et al. (2000), Newell et al. (2005), and
Costello et al. (2008) find substantial gains in economic efficiency and resource
sustainability in fisheries in which exclusive harvest rights are allocated among
individual resource users.
Although empirical research indicates that rights-based management insti-
tutions can mitigate common-pool losses, they generally do not emerge as a
2See Besley (1995), Banerjee et al. (2002), and Jacoby et al. (2002) for further emprical work
documenting the relationship between property rights institutions and agricultural productivity.
3See Alston et al. (2000) and Araujo et al. (2009) for empirical evidence linking property
rights insecurity to deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon.
3
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first-response to common-pool resource problems. Instead, the typical govern-
ment response is command and control regulation, prescriptive rules designed
to constrain user extraction effort. Libecap (2008) argues that command and
control regulation prevails initially because this approach provides some protec-
tion of the resource stock while avoiding political costs associated with rights
allocation. Further, he observes that rights-based management institutions are
typically implemented only after command and control regulation has failed to
adequately control common-pool externalities and the expected gains from rights-
based management are clear.
Libecap’s observations are consistent with classic economic theory on property
rights, which casts the emergence of property rights in common-pool resources
in a cost-benefit framework. Demsetz (1967) argues that property rights will
develop to internalize externalities when the benefits of establishing a rights-
based system exceed the costs. Anderson and Hill (1975) also assert that the
evolution of property rights institutions can be explained and predicted by a
comparison of the benefits and costs of defining and enforcing property rights.
Similarly, Cheung (1970) notes that, while there are potentially large gains from
allocating exclusively delineated, well-enforced property rights to common-pool
resource users, the costs of such arrangements are also high, and this explains
their absence in many resources.
4
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More recent work on the emergence of property rights in common-pool re-
sources emphasizes the role of transaction costs arising from heterogeneity among
resource stakeholders. Libecap (1989) provides a general analytical framework
for analyzing the development of property rights institutions in common-pool
resources that focuses on the transaction costs associated with assigning property
rights among multiple, likely heterogeneous claimants. Boyce (2004) develops
a model of management instrument choice in fisheries in which a regulator’s
decision to implement rights-based management hinges on her relative weighting
of the welfare of multiple resource stakeholders. Grainger and Costello (2012) and
Deacon et al. (2013) provide theoretical and empirical evidence that heterogeneity
in harvesting costs among fishermen can lead to opposition to rights-based man-
agement in fisheries. Wiggins and Libecap (1985) and Libecap and Smith (2002)
highlight the role of negotiation costs among heterogeneous resource users in
delaying or preventing implementation of rights-based management arrangements
in United States oil and gas reservoirs.
In this paper, I seek to contribute to the literature on the emergence of property
rights in common-pool resources by developing a general and empirically testable
conceptual framework for analyzing the transition from command and control
regulation to right-based management that can be broadly applied to a range of
empirical contexts. I then use the framework to examine the transition to rights-
5
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based management in a marine fisheries context. The paper proceeds as follows.
Section 2 presents a conceptual framework of rights-based management adoption
in which I discuss the evolution of management institutions in common-pool
resources, introduce a cost-benefit framework describing a regulator’s decision to
transition a common-pool resource from a command and control regime to a rights-
based management regime, and develop several empirically testable hypotheses.
Section 3 introduces the institutional setting for the empirical application. Section
4 lays out the duration analysis empirical approach. Section 4 describes the
dataset. Section 6 presents the main results and discusses the extent to which
they do and do not support the conceptual framework hypotheses. Section 7
concludes with thoughts on the significance of the results for U.S. fisheries policy
and further research opportunities.
1.2 Conceptual framework
1.2.1 Rent dissipation under open access
Institutional settings in common-pool resources can be broadly classified into
three regimes that generally evolve in the following order: (1) open access, (2) com-
mand and control regulation, and (3) rights-based management (Libecap 2008).4
4In this paper, I focus on command and control regulation and rights-based management
initiated by a central regulator as possible responses to open access losses. Rent dissipation in
6
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This pattern, shown in Figure 1.1, has been observed in fisheries and oil and gas
reservoirs, among other resources (Sanchirico and Wilen 2007; Libecap and Smith
2002).5 Because common-pool resources are characterized by non-excludability,
an open access regime initially prevails in which users have unrestricted access
to the resource. Under open access, competitive extraction among resource users
leads to rent dissipation along three possible dimensions: (1) resource, (2) cost,
and (3) value (Knapp and Murphy 2010).
Figure 1.1: The Evolution of Management Institutions in Common-Pool
Resources
	  	  
	  
Command	  and	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  regulation	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Access	  
	  
	  
Rights-­‐based	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common-pool resources can also be addressed through the emergence of decentralized property
rights regimes, protected by tradition or custom (e.g., Acheson 1988). In general, these regimes
are successfully implemented in a sub-group common-pool resources with specific characteristics
(see Ostrom 1990, 1998).
5This institutional trajectory has also been observed in the response to environmental
externalities resulting from the over-provision of public bads such as air pollution (see, for
example, Stavins 2007). Common-pool resources and public goods (bads) share the characteristic
of non-excludability, but differ in the characteristic of rivalry (common-pool resources are rival
in consumption, public goods (bads) are not). For this reason, aspects of the net benefits
framework describing adoption of rights-based management in common-pool resources are also
applicable to a conceptual framework of transition to rights-based management for public goods
(bads), but the framework is not directly transferrable. In particular, the costs of adoption also
apply to public goods (bads), but the benefits of differ between the two categories.
7
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The resource dimension of rent dissipation refers to forgone rents resulting from
depletion of the resource stock to a suboptimal level. In the absence of property
rights, rights to the resource are assigned according to the rule of capture in
which the first user to establish possession of the resource owns the resource. Any
units of the resource not extracted by one user may be extracted by another user,
leaving no incentive to conserve the resource for use in future periods. Moreover,
in the absence of individual rights to the resource, users capture the full benefit
of each unit of the resource extracted while bearing only a fraction of the social
cost of associated resource depletion. This disparity between the benefits received
and the costs incurred from extraction leads to suboptimal resource depletion. In
a fisheries context, the resource dimension of rent dissipation is characterized by
over-extraction of the target species and wasteful fishing practices including use of
gear that causes habitat damage, high discard rates (non-retained target species),
and high bycatch rates (catch of non-target species).
The cost dimension of rent dissipation refers to forgone rents resulting from
the cost of inefficient extraction effort and excess capital investment relative to the
social optimum. Over-investment in labor and capital and inefficiency in how both
input factors are applied to resource extraction results from competition among
users to capture the resource before other users. In fisheries, the cost dimension of
rent dissipation is often referred to as the “race to fish,” characterized by inefficient
8
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investment in the number and capacity of vessels, wasteful fishing practices (e.g.,
gear loss), and fishing in unsafe conditions.
Finally, the value dimension of rent dissipation refers to forgone rents resulting
from the failure to realize the full market value potential of the resource when it is
sold as a lower-valued product. In fisheries, the value dimension of rent dissipation
is a common outcome of the race to fish. For example the race to fish often leads
to high volumes of fish caught over short time periods resulting in higher ratios of
lower-valued frozen product to higher-valued fresh product (Homans and Wilen
2005).
The extent to which rent dissipation along these three dimensions occurs in
an open access regime depends critically on the value of the resource (Baland and
Platteau 1996). When demand for the resource is low, the resource is of low value
and rent dissipation is minimal. As the value of the resource rises due to higher
consumer demand, competition for the resource among users increases and rent
dissipation becomes more severe, leading to government intervention to correct
market failure.
1.2.2 Government response to open access
Government intervention in common-pool resources to alleviate problems of
rent dissipation is depicted in Figure 1.2 and proceeds as follows. Government
9
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is composed of politicians who are responsive to citizen demands through voting
and lobbying (Becker 1983; Peltzman 1976). Resource stakeholders are a subset
of all citizens broadly defined to include all groups affected by resource extraction
(e.g., resource users (harvesters), entities in the supply chain, local communities).
In representing the public interest and meeting resource stakeholder demands,
politicians seek to maximize rents from the common-pool resources under their ju-
risdiction while considering the distribution of rents among users. To achieve these
goals, politicians create regulatory agencies and issue bureaucratic mandates to
these agencies. Bureaucratic mandates define objectives for resource management.
Politicians then appoint regulatory officials (regulators) to set management policy
consistent with the agency’s bureaucratic mandate. Regulators accordingly seek to
set management policy to satisfy the objectives of their bureaucratic mandate. At
the same time, regulators face demands from resource stakeholders who lobby for
management policy that enables them to maximize individual rents from resource
use.
In forming management policy, regulators balance the demands of resource
stakeholders with their bureaucratic mandate, both of which contribute to trans-
action costs. Transaction costs are the regulatory agency’s administrative costs
of designing, implementing, monitoring, and enforcing a new management policy.
These costs include those associated with satisfying their bureaucratic mandate
10
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Figure 1.2: Political Economy of Common-Pool Resource Management
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and accounting for lobbying from users concerned about the relative distribution
of rents resulting rom a policy change. The bargaining positions taken by various
resource users depend on how they view their expected welfare to change under
the new institutional arrangement relative to the status quo. In general, the more
numerous and heterogenous the users and the greater the difference between the
distribution of rents under the status quo and the projected distribution of rents
under new policy, the larger the transaction costs (Libecap 1989).
Regulators commonly respond to open access losses initially by enacting com-
mand and control regulation. Command and control regulations are uniform
standards aimed at constraining user extraction behavior to mitigate one or more
dimensions of rent dissipation. Examples include placing a quota on the level
11
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of resource extraction permitted in a given time period, limiting entry, and is-
suing restrictions on production inputs. Command and control regulations are
consistent with the regulator’s objectives initially because they typically offer
some mitigation of rent dissipation with relatively low transaction costs compared
to rights-based management. Command and control regulations are often less
politically contentious compared to rights-based approaches because uniform stan-
dards typically preserve relative rent distribution among users, and they are thus
met with less opposition from resource users on distributional grounds (Libecap
2008). Rights-based management programs may also require more institutional
infrastructure and incur larger administrative costs relative to command and
control approaches.6
1.2.3 Transition from command and control regulation to
rights-based management
In general, command and control regulation is not sufficient to solve common-
pool problems in the long-term because users will continue to dissipate rents along
unregulated margins (Homans and Wilen 1997). In contrast, rights-based man-
agement policies, which allocate secure rights to the resource among individuals
6For example, the Magnuson-Stevens Act includes specific provisions for cost recovery to
offset additional administrative costs resulting from catch share programs. See Magnuson-
Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 109-479,
(2007).
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or groups of resource users, are more effective at mitigating rent dissipation by
alleviating competition for rents among users and providing incentives for resource
stewardship, but they may also have high transaction costs. Following previous
theory on the emergence of property rights in common-pool resources, I argue that
a regulator will adopt a rights-based management program if, from the perspective
of the regulator, the net benefits of adoption are larger than the net benefits under
the status quo command and control regime. This statement leads to the following
four hypotheses about a regulator’s decision to adopt a rights-based management
program:
Resource Dimension Hypothesis: Rights-based management program adop-
tion is more likely when the resource dimension of rent dissipation under the status
quo regime is high.
Cost Dimension Hypothesis: Rights-based management program adoption
is more likely when the cost dimension of rent dissipation under the status quo
regime is high.
Value Dimension Hypothesis: Rights-based management program adoption
is more likely when the value dimension of rent dissipation under the status quo
13
Chapter 1. Transition to Property Rights in Common-Pool Resources
regime is high.
The Resource, Cost, and Value Dimension Hypotheses imply that the higher the
potential benefits for mitigating rent dissipation from replacing a command and
control regime with a rights-based regime, the more likely rights-based manage-
ment adoption will occur. The potential benefits from rights-based management
adoption are directly related to the extent to which existing command and control
regulations are able to mitigate rent dissipation. For instance, if a regulator is
able to successfully implement and enforce a resource extraction quota under a
command and control regime consistent with an optimal extraction path, the
resource dimension of rent dissipation under the status quo regime and, thus, the
benefits from transition to rights-based regime may be low. On the other hand, if
this policy is unable to adequately halt wasteful resource degradation, there may
be large gains from rights-based management along the resource dimension.
Transaction Costs Hypothesis: Rights-based management program adoption
is more likely when the transaction costs of program adoption are low.
The Transaction Costs Hypothesis states that lower the transaction costs of the
policy change, the more likely we are to observe a transition to rights-based
14
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management. The level of transaction costs may change over time based on factors
such as the number and heterogeneity of resource users, availability of information
about resource status, and the state of institutional infrastructure.
In delineating the categories of benefits and costs of the transition from com-
mand and control regulation to rights-based management, the framework is ag-
nostic about the relative weight the regulator places on each; this is an empirical
question. I now provide an empirical application to a group of federally-managed
fisheries in Alaska to give context to the conceptual framework and to test the
hypotheses about the determinants of rights-based management adoption.
1.3 Empirical application: The institutional set-
ting
1.3.1 United States fisheries policy
In the late 1970s, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
provided the legal framework for coastal nations to establish jurisdiction over
marine resources up to 200 miles off their coastline through the establishment
of exclusive economic zones (EEZs). This international agreement marked an
important transition from open access to command and control regulation in
15
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many commercially important fisheries as coastal nations enacted national fish-
eries management legislation to establish their EEZ and form regulatory agencies
responsible for managing domestic fisheries.
The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, later renamed the
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, established the
United States’ 200-mile EEZ and created eight Regional Fishery Management
Councils responsible for establishing management policy for stocks occurring in
federal waters (3 to 200 miles offshore). Councils are composed of between 7 and
21 voting members and 4 non-voting members representing a range of bureaucratic
and fishing industry viewpoints. Voting members are comprised of: (1) regulatory
officials from related fisheries management agencies in the Council’s jurisdiction,
including the National Marine Fisheries Service and state fisheries management
agencies, and (2) members appointed by the Secretary of Commerce based on
gubernatorial nominations from states in the Council’s jurisdiction. Appointed
members are typically representatives from the fishing industry.
The Magnuson-Stevens Act is the principal component of the Councils’ bu-
reaucratic mandate. It defines each Council’s required functions including the
development of fishery management plans (FMPs), documents that establish man-
agement and conservation measures for each fishery or group of fisheries under its
jurisdiction that requires management. The establishment of an FMP therefore
16
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represents the initiation of command and control regulation at the federal level.
The Councils can then pass subsequent amendments to the FMP to modify exist-
ing command and control regulations or implement a rights-based management
program.
The Magnuson-Stevens Act specifies ten National Standards for fishery con-
servation and management and requires all FMPs to be consistent with these
standards. The National Standards include provisions for rent maximization,
requiring management measures to “prevent overfishing while achieving, on a
continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery for the United States
fishing industry,” and “where practicable, consider efficiency in the utilization of
fishery resources.”7 At the same time, the National Standards require the Councils
to consider the transaction costs of new policies, including distributional costs,
mandating that management measures “where practicable, minimize costs” and
“minimize adverse economic impacts on [fishing] communities.”8 The National
Standards also state that if it “becomes necessary to allocate or assign fishing
privileges among various United States fishermen, such allocation shall be... fair
and equitable to all such fishermen.” Further, the Magnuson-Stevens Act requires
Councils to hold public hearings to “allow all interested persons an opportunity
7Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act, Pub. L.
No. 109-479, (2007).
8Ibid.
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to be heard in the development of fishery management plans and amendments to
such plans.”9
In addition to upholding the Magnuson-Stevens Act, Councils must adhere to
the requisites of several other statutes. Among these statues is Executive Order
12866 on regulatory planning and review, which requires regulatory agencies to
“assess all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives, including the
alternative of not regulating” and to “select those approaches that maximize net
benefits (including potential economic, environmental, public health and safety,
and other advantages; distributive impacts; and equity).”10 Councils must also
uphold the standards of the Endangered Species Act, the National Environmental
Policy Act, which requires federal agencies to incorporate environmental consider-
ations in their planning and decision-making, and the Regulatory Flexibility Act,
which requires consideration of impact of proposed regulations on the needs and
capabilities of small businesses and other small entities.
When considering a major policy change such as a transition from command
and control regulation to rights-based management, Councils seek to satisfy their
bureaucratic mandate by having Council staff prepare an Environmental Assess-
ment/Regulatory Impact Review/Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis docu-
ment, which lays out the regulatory alternatives and the capacity of each to fulfill
9Ibid.
10Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 190 (Oct. 4 1993).
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the Council’s bureaucratic mandate. In addition, there exist ample opportunities
for resource stakeholders to lobby the Councils throughout the policy-making
process through written comment or oral testimony at Council meetings.
1.3.2 Rights-based management adoption in Alaska fish-
eries
The North Pacific Fishery Management Council establishes management pol-
icy for federally controlled fisheries in Alaska. Consistent with the Councils’
bureaucratic mandate, in managing the fisheries under its jurisdiction, the North
Pacific Fishery Management Council has a stated commitment to providing “the
maximum benefit to present generations of fishermen, associated fishing industry
sectors, communities, consumers, and the nation as a whole” (NPFMC 2006).
For fisheries management purposes, federal waters in Alaska are divided into
two main regions: (1) the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands (BSAI), and (2) the
Gulf of Alaska (GOA) (Figure 1.3). Within these two regions, three fishery
management plans establish management measures for 98% of federally-managed
Alaska fisheries by volume and 80% by value: (1) the Bering Sea and Aleutian
Islands Groundfish Fishery Management Plan (BSAI Groundfish FMP), (2) the
Gulf of Alaska Groundfish Fishery Management Plan (GOA Groundfish FMP),
and (3) the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Crab Fishery Management Plan
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(Crab FMP) (NPFMC 2012, Hiatt et al. 2011). Table A.1 in the Appendix lists
fisheries included in this study and the FMPs to which they belong.11 Fisheries are
defined as species-management area combinations (e.g., Bering Sea pollock) with
a regulated annual total allowable catch (TAC). Within fisheries, the TAC may
be further allocated among multiple fishing sectors. A fishing sector is defined
as a group of vessels of the same type using the same gear to fish. In Alaska,
harvesting vessels are divided into two types: (1) catcher vessels that deliver
catch to shoreside processors and (2) catcher/processor vessels that both harvest
and process fish. The primary gear types are trawl, longline, pot, and jig.
In fisheries, rights-based management programs are commonly called catch
shares.12 When a catch share program is adopted, it may include only a particular
sector or sectors within a fishery and thus only include a portion of the TAC. In
the primary empirical specifications, I consider a fishery as having adopted catch
shares if at least 50% of the fishery TAC is allocated to a catch share program, but
I also consider models in which catch share adoption is defined as any percentage
of the TAC allocated to a catch share program.
11The Scallop, Salmon, and Arctic FMPs are excluded from the analysis. The fisheries
managed in these FMPs constitute a relatively small component of Alaska fishing activity in
federal waters.
12Types of catch share programs include: individual transferrable quotas (ITQs), and their
variants, in which shares of the TAC are allocated to individual users; cooperatives in which
shares of the TAC are allocated to groups of users; and territorial user rights for fisheries
(TURFs) in which spatial rights are allocated to individuals or groups (Hannesson 2004).
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Figure 1.3: Alaska Fisheries Management Areas
A timeline of major management events affecting the fisheries in the study is
shown in Figure 1.4. The three FMPs included in the study were adopted between
1978 and 1989. In 1996, the Council amended the FMPs to a implement a limited
entry policy by first placing a moratorium on new vessel entry and subsequently
introducing a formal license limitation program regulating vessel entry and exit in
each fishery. Since limited entry was established, several fisheries have transitioned
to rights-based management under four catch share programs summarized in Table
21
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1.1.13 Three of the programs were designed and adopted by the North Pacific
Fishery Management Council and one was enacted by federal legislation.14 The
BSAI American Fisheries Act Pollock Cooperatives program implemented coop-
eratives in the Bering Sea pollock fishery in 1999 under the American Fisheries
Act. The BSAI King and Tanner Crab Rationalization Program began in 2005
and created a program with ITQ and cooperatives elements for eight of the BSAI
crab fisheries. The Central GOA Rockfish Pilot Cooperatives program, adopted in
2007, allocated 95% of the TAC of the three primary species (Pacific ocean perch,
Northern rockfish, and pelagic shelf rockfish) and smaller portions of the TAC of
several secondary species (thornyhead rockfish, shortraker and rougheye rockfish,
Pacific cod, and sablefish) among several catcher and catcher/processor vessel
cooperatives. Finally, the BSAI American Fisheries Act Non-Pollock Cooperatives
program (commonly referred to as Amendment 80), adopted in 2008, allocated
90-100% of the TAC in the yellowfin sole, rock sole, flathead sole, Atka mackerel,
and Aleutian Islands Pacific ocean perch fisheries as well as 13.4% of the Pacific
cod TAC as catch shares to voluntarily formed fishing cooperatives.
13I do not consider the 1992 Western Alaska Community Development Quota (CDQ) Program
a catch share program for purposes of analysis. Although this program does allocate exclusive use
rights to a portion of the TAC in certain fisheries in the BSAI Groundfish and Crab FMPs, these
allocationa are small (<15%), and primarily for distributional purposes (to promote economic
development and alleviate poverty in Western Alaska) rather than to improve aggregate fisheries
outcomes. Except where noted, the data exclude CDQ allocations. I also exclude the 1995
Halibut and Sablefish IFQ program from the analysis.
14See Fina (2011) for a detailed qualitative summary of the design and implementation of
catch share programs in Alaska.
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Figure 1.4: Alaska Fisheries Management Timeline
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1.4 Econometric framework
1.4.1 Duration analysis
I use duration analysis to empirically identify the determinants of catch share
program adoption in the Alaska fisheries dataset. Duration analysis provides
a natural empirical approach for economic applications in which the response
variable is the time elapsed until a certain event occurs (see Kiefer (1988) and
Wooldridge (2002) for an overview). The primary advantages of using duration
models in this context are that right-censored observations, fisheries that never
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adopt a catch share program during the observation period, are handled in a
straightforward way using maximum likelihood methods, and both time-constant
and time-varying covariates can be introduced without any estimation or concep-
tual problems.
Duration models are estimated in terms of a hazard function, λ(t), which
represents the instantaneous probability of an event (catch share program adop-
tion) conditional on the event not having occurred prior to time t. Let f(t) be
a continuous probability density of a random variable T , the number of years
until catch share program adoption. The corresponding cumulative distribution
function is given by F (t). Equivalently, the distribution of T can be expressed by
the survivor function,
S(t) = 1− F (t) = Pr(T > t), (1.1)
the probability that catch shares are adopted after time t. The survivor function
equals 1 at t = 0 and weakly decreases towards 0 as t goes to infinity. That is, we
assume that all fisheries eventually adopt catch shares. Analytically, the hazard
function is defined as
λ(t) = lim
h→0
= Pr(t ≤ T < t+ h|T ≥ t)
h
= f(t)
S(t) . (1.2)
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To introduce fishery-level characteristics that can vary over the observation
period, one must parameterize the hazard rate as a function of these characteris-
tics. Let x(t) denote the vector of regressors that affect the probability of catch
share program adoption at time t. For t ≥ 0, let X(t) be the covariate path up
through time t. The conditional hazard function is defined as
λ[t|X(t)] = lim
h→0
= Pr[t ≤ T < t+ h|T ≥ t,X(t+ h)]
h
. (1.3)
The most widely used formulation of the conditional hazard function in Equation
1.3 is the proportional hazards model with time-varying covariates
λ[t|x(t)] = λ0(t,α)φ[x(t),β], (1.4)
where λ0(·) > 0 is a baseline hazard common to all fisheries, φ[·] is a nonnegative
function that multiplicatively shifts the baseline hazard, and α and β are a
parameter vectors. The most common choice of φ[·] is the exponential form, φ[·]
= exp[x(t)β]. Thus, a fundamental assumption of proportional hazard models,
known as the proportional-hazards assumption, is that the baseline hazard is the
same for all fisheries, but its shape is multiplicatively shifted by fishery-level
characteristics.
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I estimate Equation 1.4 using a Cox proportional hazards model (Cox 1972)
specification
λ[t|x(t)] = λ0(t)exp[x(t)β], (1.5)
The Cox model is a semiparametric model in which the baseline hazard is left
unspecified and estimation is conducted with a partial likelihood approach. Com-
pared to a correctly specified fully parametric model, the β-estimator is inefficient,
but the efficiency loss is small, and avoids problems of inconsistency in a misspec-
ified parametric model (Cameron and Trivedi 2005). Therefore, the Cox model
is an advantageous approach for the current case in which there is no obvious
theoretical assumption about the functional form of the baseline hazard.
1.4.2 Unobserved heterogeneity
An important identification issue is the possible presence of unobserved het-
erogeneity among groups of fisheries. That is, one might be concerned that the
hazard rate of catch share adoption varies among groups of fisheries in ways
that are unaccounted for by the model covariates. Specifically, when fisheries
are harvested concurrently (e.g., species are caught together in the same trawl
tows) or fished by the same fishing fleet, regulators often implement management
policy changes for the entire group of fisheries.
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I account for this issue in two ways. First, I consider models with management
area and fishery management plan fixed effects. These models indirectly capture
group effects among fisheries by controlling for fisheries located in the same
geographic region and for fisheries grouped together and managed collectively
by the North Pacific Fishery Management Council. Second, I estimate a shared
frailty model in which a latent random effect for fishery groups enters the hazard
function multiplicatively.15 To estimate a Cox model with shared frailty, the data
are organized into i = 1, ..., n groups with j = 1, ..., ni fisheries in the ith group.
For the jth fishery in the ith group, the hazard function becomes
λij[t|xij(t)] = γiλ0(t)exp(xijβ). (1.6)
where γi is the group-level random effect, which is assumed to have mean 1 and
variance θ and is estimated along with the other parameters in the model. When
θ = 0, the shared frailty model simply reduces to the standard Cox proportional
hazards model. Table A.2 in the Appendix enumerates the groups and provides
rationales for the groupings. Generally, fisheries are assigned to the same group if
they jointly adopted a catch share program or are harvested by the same fishing
fleet (NPFMC 2012).
15Shared frailty is a term used in duration analysis to describe regression models with random
effects.
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1.5 Data
To test the hypotheses advanced in the conceptual framework in a fisheries
context, I assemble a panel dataset of 68 federally-managed fisheries in Alaska
observed annually from 1996-2010. The data come from several sources produced
by NOAA’s National Marine Fisheries Service including Stock Assessment and
Fishery Evaluation Reports (SAFEs), Catch Reports, Harvest Specification Ta-
bles, Status of Fisheries Reports, Weekly Production Reports, and groundfish
landings tickets as well as the Alaska Department of Fish and Game’s Shellfish
Observer Program Fishery Management Reports, and crab fish ticket and eLand-
ings data. A summary of the variables included in the analysis appears in Table
3.5 along with the expected effect of each variable on the likelihood of catch share
program adoption.
Four variables measure the resource dimension of rent dissipation. The first
two variables, stock status and overfishing status, are the primary indicators used
to assess the biological status of federally managed fisheries (NOAA 2011). Stock
status is defined as the ratio of stock biomass, B, to the maximum sustainable
yield biomass, BMSY , (or equivalent) as defined for each fish stock in the stock
assessment reports.16 The higher this ratio, the healthier the fish stock and the
16In some cases, a single fish stock is managed as multiple fisheries, and in these cases, I assign
the same stock status to each fishery.
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smaller the implied resource dimension of rent dissipation. A stock is generally
considered healthy if this metric is at least 1 and “overfished” if it is less than
0.5.17 Stock status is only defined for 47 fisheries in the sample; the remaining
fisheries lack adequate stock assessment data to measure this reference point.
Overfishing status is calculated as the percentage of the overfishing level (OFL)
defined in the stock assessment reports realized by the aggregate catch. A higher
percentage implies a larger resource dimension of rent dissipation. In particular,
if this percentage exceeds 100, the fishery is considered “subject to overfishing”
in that year. The principal difference between overfishing status and stock status
is that overfishing status is a short-term measure of the fishing mortality rate
determined entirely by harvesting activity within a single year. Stock status, in
contrast, is a long-term measure of stock level, which can be affected by both the
fishing mortality rate as well as other factors including natural population cycles,
habitat degradation, climate change (i.e., ocean temperature and acidification),
and water pollution.
I also include two additional variables that measure widely cited indicators of
ecological stewardship in fisheries and rationales for catch share program adoption,
the discard rate and the bycatch rate (Essington 2010; Brinson and Thunberg
17See stock assessment reports for further detail: http://www.afsc.noaa.
gov/REFM/Stocks/assessments.htm (groundfish) and http://www.npfmc.org/
safe-stock-assessment-and-fishery-evaluation-reports/ (crab).
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2013). The discard rate is the percentage of non-retained total catch. A higher
discard rate implies a larger resource dimension of rent dissipation because dis-
cards contribute to the overall fishing mortality rate. I measure the bycatch rate
indirectly by including a bycatch closure indicator that takes the value ‘1’ if the
fishery is closed during the fishing season to avoid exceeding regulated non-target
species catch limits.
Two metrics proxy for the cost and value dimensions of rent dissipation: (1)
season length, the number of days the fishery is open to commercial fishing in
a given year, and (2) TAC exceeded, a binary variable indicating whether the
aggregate catch was greater than the fishery TAC.18 These metrics were recently
used to assess the ex post economic performance of U.S. catch share programs
(Brinson and Thunberg 2013). Shorter season lengths and TAC overages both
indicate a more extreme race to fish, potentially resulting in inefficient capital
investment and harvesting effort and lower-valued product, and they therefore
imply larger cost and value dimensions of rent dissipation.
Three variables proxy for the transaction costs of catch share program adoption
by measuring the number and heterogeneity of resource users. The first variable is
the number of active vessels in a fishery, a proxy for the number of resource users.19
18TAC overages typically occur when fishing occurs at speed such that fishery managers are
not able to effectively close the fishery immediately when the TAC is acheived.
19An ideal measure of the number of resource users would be the number of firms active in
each fishery. Instead, I assume that the number of vessels is highly correlated with the number
of firms.
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The second variable is the number of fishery sectors, determined from the North
Pacific Fishery Management Council Fishing Fleet Profiles and Groundfish Species
Profiles (NPFMC 2011, NPFMC 2012). The third variable is the Gini coefficient
(calculated using the Deaton formula and expressed as a percentage), which
measures the degree of inequality in the distribution of revenues among active
vessels (Deaton 1997). A value of 0% represents a perfectly uniform distribution
of revenues among vessels, and value of 100% represents maximal inequality (i.e.,
one vessel captures all the revenue). The number of sectors and the Gini coefficient
measure the level of heterogeneity among users. The larger the value of each of
these metrics, the higher the implied transaction costs of catch share program
adoption.
Finally, in addition to the variables of interest, I include several control vari-
ables. Aggregate catch and average ex-vessel price control for the size and value
of the fishery to account for the effects of market conditions on catch share
adoption.20 Management area and fishery management area fixed effects control
for unobserved effects across geographic regions and management groupings.
Figure 1.5 presents a Kaplan-Meier survival function estimate, a graphical
summary of catch share program adoption among fisheries in the sample. The
Kaplan-Meier estimator is a nonparametric estimate of the survival function S(t)
20I convert nominal prices to real prices using the Producer Price Index for unprocessed and
packaged fish.
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where discreet jumps indicate catch share program adoption. At the end of the
observation period, the probability of survival is still quite high, 73.5%, reflecting
the fact that a majority of fisheries in the sample have not yet adopted catch share
programs.
Figure 1.5: Kaplan-Meier estimate for Alaska fisheries data
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Table 1.3 reports descriptive statistics and differences in means between fish-
eries that do and do not adopt catch shares during the observation period, cal-
culated using 1996 data, the first year of the analysis period. Columns (1)
through (3) report means and standard errors for the entire sample and for
fisheries that did and did not adopt catch shares during the observation period,
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respectively. Column (4) reports the difference in the means of the catch share
and non-catch share fisheries along with the standard error from a t-test of the null
hypothesis that this difference is equal to zero. Table 1.3 is consistent with the
Cost Dimension, Value Dimension, and Transaction Costs Hypotheses. Fisheries
that adopt catch shares tend to have shorter season lengths and are more likely to
have TAC overages prior to the transition to rights-based management compared
to fisheries that do not adopt catch shares, supporting the idea that catch share
program adoption is more likely if the cost and value dimensions of rent dissipation
are large. Similarly, fisheries that adopt catch shares tend to have fewer active
vessels, fewer sectors, and smaller Gini coefficients relative to fisheries that do
not adopt catch shares, supporting the idea that catch share program adoption is
more likely if transaction costs are low.
In contrast, Table 1.3 gives limited evidence in support of the Resource Di-
mension Hypothesis. Although fisheries that adopt catch shares tend to have
lower stock status metrics and higher overfishing status metrics prior to the
transition compared to fisheries that do not adopt catch shares, neither difference
is statistically significant. Additionally, discard and bycatch closure rates are lower
among fisheries that transition to catch shares. More generally, the data indicate
that resource depletion is not of high concern in most Alaska fisheries, regardless of
whether they adopt catch shares. The mean stock status in the full sample is 1.59
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(1.49 for fisheries that adopt catch shares), well above the overfished threshold of
0.5, and the mean overfishing indicator is 37.8% (44.8% for fisheries that adopt
catch shares), well below the overfishing threshold of 100%. These findings are not
necessarily surprising in the Alaska context because catch limits for fisheries in
this region have historically been set conservatively to maintain sustainable stocks,
and command and control regulations are generally well-enforced (NPFMC 2011).
1.6 Empirical results
1.6.1 Main results
Table 1.4 reports hazard ratios and t-statistics corresponding to estimated
coefficients from Cox proportional hazards models of catch share program adop-
tion for the full sample. Hazard ratios are exponentiated coefficient estimates,
and they measure the change in the probability of catch share program adoption
for a one-unit change in the corresponding covariate. A hazard ratio greater
(less) than one indicates an increase (decrease) in the probability of catch share
program adoption. For example, in Column (3), a 1% increase in overfishing status
increases the probability of catch shares adoption by 2.9%, and 1% increase in the
discard rate decreases the probability of catch shares adoption by 5.2%.
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Columns (1) through (3) report estimates from standard Cox proportional
hazards models. Columns (4) through (6) present results from shared frailty
versions of models in columns (1) through (3) using the fishery groups described
in Section 4.2. Column (3), which controls for unobserved heterogeneity with
fishery management plan and management area fixed effects, is the preferred
specification. Wald tests reject the null hypotheses that fishery management plan
and management area fixed effects are jointly equal to zero at the 5% and 1%
levels respectively. The magnitude and statistical significance of the hazard ratios
corresponding to the variables of interest are generally similar across columns
(1) through (3), but the variation that does exist suggests the importance of
accounting for unobserved heterogeneity among fisheries.
The shared frailty models in columns (4) through (6) provide evidence that
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity using area and management plan fixed
effects is a reasonable approach. The estimated frailty variance, θˆ, in columns
(5) and (6) is essentially zero and likelihood ratio tests fail to reject the null
hypothesis that θ equals zero, which reduces the model estimates to the standard
Cox model estimates reported in columns (2) and (3). In column (4), likelihood-
ratio test of the null hypothesis that θ equals zero rejects at the 5% level. I use
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to compare the models in columns (3)
and (4). The AIC is lower for column (3), which, taken together with models (4)
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and (5), suggests that management plan and area fixed effects are a reasonable
approach to controling for unobserved differences among fisheries.
Focusing on the preferred specification in column (3), there is strong evidence
supporting the Cost and Value Dimension and the Transaction Costs hypotheses
from the conceptual framework. Consistent with the Cost and Value Dimension
hypotheses, a one day decrease in season length increases the probability of catch
share program adoption by 3.1%. Similarly, the estimated hazard ratios for the
number of vessels, the number of sectors, and the Gini coefficient support the
Transaction Costs Hypothesis – greater numbers of and heterogeneity among
resource users decrease the likelihood of catch share program adoption. An
additional vessel decreases the probability of catch share program adoption by
0.6% (although this value is not statistically significant), an additional sector by
65%, and a one percentage increase in the Gini coefficient by 4.1%. Column
(3) gives mixed evidence with respect to the Resource Dimension Hypothesis.
Although an increase in the overfishing metric and a bycatch closure both increase
the probability of catch share program adoption, a 1% increase in the discard rate
lowers the probability of catch share program adoption by 5.5%.
One potential issue with the empirical specifications in Table 1.4 is that stock
status is omitted because only 47 of the 68 fisheries sampled have formal stock
assessments that produce stock status data. To assess the extent to which leaving
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out stock status leads to omitted variable bias, I examine a restricted sample of
fisheries with stock status data. In column (1) of Table 1.5, I reestimate model
(3) from Table 1.4 with the restricted sample. The estimated hazard ratios on the
variables of interest are generally similar in magnitude and statistical significance
to the specification in column (2) that includes stock status, which supports the
idea that omitting stock status does not lead to serious omitted variable bias.
Table 1.5 reveals important additional information about the Resource Di-
mension Hypothesis. In column (2), the estimated hazard ratio for stock status
indicates that healthier stocks are more likely to adopt catch shares while fisheries
that have higher overfishing status and experience bycatch closures are also more
likely to adopt. A potential explanation for this mixed evidence for the Resource
Dimension Hypothesis is as follows. In regions such as Alaska where harvest
levels are set conservatively under command and control regulation to protect the
resource stocks, resource managers may be particularly diligent about protecting
and maintaining the long-term health of high-value stocks – the same fisheries
that are likely to adopt catch shares. In these situations, a more likely vector
along which to observe the resource dimension of rent dissipation is in short-term
metrics of resource pressure such as annual overfishing status and bycatch rates,
which can be high even while maintaining long-term stock health if thresholds
for these indicators are set conservatively enough under command and control
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regulation. Moreover, in this empirical context, command and control regulation
appears to be doing an adequate job of preventing long-term resource depletion.
Thus, the resource dimension gains from catch share program adoption are likely
small, and those that do exist are those associated with mitigating short-term
(flow) metrics of resource depletion such as overfishing status and bycatch rates.
I also consider the implications of redefining catch share adoption, so that a
fishery is considered to have adopted catch shares regardless of the percentage
of the overall TAC that is allocated to a catch share program. This redefinition
designates four additional fisheries as having adopted catch shares: 1) the BSAI
Pacific cod fishery in the Amendment 80 Cooperatives and 2) the Pacific cod,
thornyhead rockfish, and shortraker and rougheye rockfish fisheries in the Central
GOA Rockfish Pilot Cooperatives Program. Table 1.6 re-estimates models (1)
through (4) in Table 1.4 with this definition of catch shares adoption. Com-
paratively low pseudo R-squared values from the standard Cox models and high
log-likelihood values in all model specifications indicate that the catch shares
adoption definition used in Table 1.4 has significantly more explanatory power.
From a policy perspective, this result is not surprising. These fisheries were not
the main impetus for their respective catch share programs. Rather, species from
these fisheries tend to be caught along with the species of the fisheries that were
the primary focus of these catch share programs, and they are the main target of
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other other sectors within the fishery for which catch shares have not (yet) been
adopted.
Finally, the proportional-hazards assumption is a central requirement for iden-
tification in Cox models. To verify the proportional-hazards assumption, I imple-
ment a test based on Schoenfeld residuals for all reported models (Cleves et al.
2010). I find no evidence that the proportional-hazards assumption is violated.
1.6.2 Predicting catch share program adoption
A limitation of the Cox proportional hazards approach is that, since the
baseline hazard is not estimated, one cannot use the model to predict future catch
share program adoption among fisheries that do not transition to rights-based
management during the observation period. A fully parametric model, in contrast,
can be used for prediction. Table 1.7 presents a ranked list of fisheries by predicted
catch share adoption year from the group of fisheries that did not adopt a catch
share program during the observation period, based on a Weibull regression model
estimated with the covariates of column (3) in Table 1.4. The Weibull proportional
hazards model assumes a baseline hazard of the form h0(t) = pt(p−1)exp(β0), which
allows for a variety of monotonically increasing or decreasing shapes depending
on the value of the estimated parameter p, and it was selected over other common
parametric specifications (e.g., exponential, Gompertz) because it had the lowest
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AIC score. Table 1.8 reproduces column (3) of Table 1.4 for comparison to the
Weibull specification. The hazard ratio estimates from the Weibull model are
generally (although not always) of the same direction and of similar magnitude
to those of the Cox model.
Predicted years of catch share program adoption were constructed by comput-
ing the expected value of the survival time (the integral of the survival function)
and plugging in the estimated model parameters and year 2010 covariate values.
For each fishery, this produces an estimate of the number of years until catch
share program adoption based on conditions at the end of the observation period.
Although the estimated year of adoption is based on the assumption of time-
constant covariates based on 2010 values, the rank ordering is meaningful if the
relative magnitudes of covariate values among fisheries are consistent over time.
Of the 15 fisheries with the shortest predicted times to catch share program
adoption listed in Table 1.7, the North Pacific Fishery Management Council is
in the process of considering catch share program adoption for 8 of these under
a proposed program for the Central Gulf of Alaska groundfish fisheries caught
primarily by a fleet of trawl vessels (NPFMC 2014). Additionally, while the
Council has not adopted a federally-regulated catch share program BSAI Pacific
Cod, an industry-created voluntary cooperative program began in this fishery in
August 2010 (Brinson and Thunberg 2013).
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These results serve two purposes. First, they provide some indication of
internal validity of the empirical model. Fisheries currently under consideration
for catch share programs are generally those predicted to adopt catch shares next
by the model. Second, they offer policy recommendations for the North Pacific
Fishery Management Council insofar as they identify fisheries with appropriate
characteristics for future catch share program development and implementation
given observed patterns of catch share program adoption in Alaska.
1.7 Conclusion
An emerging literature on the performance of rights-based management poli-
cies indicates that these management tools can improve both economic and eco-
logical outcomes in common-pool resources relative to open access and command
and control regulation regimes. This paper seeks to explain the determinants of
the transition from command and control regulation to rights-based management
in common-pool resources through a general conceptual framework of rights-based
management adoption and a specific empirical application to a group of federally
managed Alaska fisheries.
Consistent with the recent literature on fishery management reform (see, for
example, Grainger and Parker 2013), I find that while production inefficiency
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motivates the transition to rights-based management, transactions costs arising
from heterogeneity resource users leads to delay in catch share program adoption.
I also find a nuanced relationship between resource depletion and the transition
to property rights in the empirical context studied.
There are at least two vectors along which this line of research could be
extended and improved. First, the empirical analysis focuses on transaction costs
arising from resource users narrowly defined (vessels owners). However, other
resource stakeholders including vessel crew members, processors, non-commercial
fishery sectors, local communities, and environmental groups often exert impor-
tant political influence on catch share program adoption, and I do not explic-
itly account for this in the empirical analysis. For example, the BSAI Crab
Rationalization Program was the result of a six year design process undertaken
by the North Pacific Fishery Management Council that explicitly attempted to
accommodate a variety of stakeholders including vessel owners, captains, crew,
processors, and local communities (Fina 2011). Future work could place more
emphasis on quantifying the influence of multiple stakeholders in the transition
from command and control regulation to rights-based management.
Second, a key finding of the empirical analysis is that production inefficiency
under command and control regulation and transactions costs are clearer determi-
nants of the transition to rights-based management relative to resource depletion.
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This result is not necessarily surprising in the Alaska context where fishery man-
agers have a long history of commitment to and success in resource conservation,
but it would be useful to examine the extent to which this result holds in other
institutional contexts.
Finally, the results of this study offer important insights relevant to United
States fisheries management policy. NOAA’s 2010 Catch Share Policy calls for
“the consideration and adoption of catch shares wherever appropriate in fishery
management and ecosystem plans and their amendments, and will support the
design, implementation, and monitoring of catch share programs,” but there
has been little formal guidance on which fisheries to focus catch share adoption
efforts (NOAA 2010). By systematically identifying characteristics of fisheries
where catch shares have been successfully adopted, this analysis provides a basis
for distinguishing fisheries in which regulators might target future catch share
program adoption efforts.
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Table 1.1: Summary of Catch Share Fisheries
Program Year Number Fisheries
BSAI American Fisheries 1999 1 BS pollock
Act Pollock Cooperatives
Bristol Bay red king crab
BS snow crab
BSAI King & Tanner Crab 2005 5 BS Tanner crab
Rationalization Program Pribilof Islands red and blue king crab
St. Matthew Island blue king crab
Central GOA Pacific ocean perch
Central GOA Rockfish 2007 3 Central GOA Northern rockfish
Pilot Cooperatives Central GOA pelagic shelf rockfish
BSAI yellowfin sole
BSAI rock sole
BSAI flathead sole
BSAI American Fisheries 2008 9 Eastern AI/BS Atka mackerel
Act Non-Pollock Cooperatives Central AI Atka mackerel
(Amendment 80) Western AI Atka mackerel
Eastern AI Pacific ocean perch
Central AI Pacific ocean perch
Western AI Pacific ocean perch
Notes: The BSAI Crab Rationalization Program includes three additional fisheries not in the analysis
due to limited data availability: Western AI golden king crab, Eastern AI golden king crab, and Western AI
red king crab.
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Table 1.2: Variables Summary
Expected
Category Variable Description sign
Stock status B/BMSY (or equivalent) -
Resource dimension Overfishing status (Aggregate catch/OFL)×100% +
of rent dissipation Discard rate Percentage of total catch not retained +
Bycatch closure ‘1’ if fishery closed due to bycatch +
Cost/value dimension Season length Number of days fishery is open -
of rent dissipation TAC Exceeded ‘1’ if aggregate catch > TAC +
Vessels Number of active vessels -
Transaction costs Sectors Number of sectors -
Gini coefficient Measure of vessel-level revenue equality -
Average price Average ex-vessel price (2010$/lb)
Controls Aggregate catch Aggregate catch (thousand mt)
FMP FE Fishery management plan fixed effects
AREA FE Management area fixed effects
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Table 1.3: Baseline Descriptive Statistics and Differences in Means
Catch Share Non-Catch
All Fisheries Fisheries Share Fisheries Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Resource Dimension
Stock status† 1.59 1.49 1.65 -0.16
(0.09) (0.16) (0.12) (0.20)
Overfishing status 37.78 44.77 35.16 9.60
(3.09) (6.11) (3.54) (6.88)
Discard rate 21.99 21.89 22.02 -0.13
(2.12) (3.63) (2.59) (4.85)
Bycatch closure 0.29 0.17 0.34 -0.17
(0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.13)
Cost/Value Dimension
Season length 157.5 66.3 190.3 -124.1***
(15.30) (17.72) (17.68) (31.42)
TAC Exceeded 0.21 0.39 0.14 0.25**
(0.05) (0.12) (0.05) (0.11)
Transaction Costs
Vessels 120.6 107.1 125.6 -18.42
(15.03) (17.30) (19.51) (34.25)
Sectors 2.34 1.50 2.64 -1.14***
(0.18) (0.12) (0.23) (0.39)
Gini coefficient 75.24 61.83 80.07 -18.24***
(2.15) (5.81) (1.62) (4.38)
Controls
Average price 0.77 1.33 0.57 0.77**
(0.15) (0.46) (0.10) 0.32
Aggregate catch 28.48 81.10 9.54 71.55*
(16.55) (60.53) (4.89) (36.75)
Fisheries 68 18 50
Notes: For each variable, I report the mean and standard error for the full sample and fisheries
that do and do not adopt catch share programs using 1996 data, the first year of the sample. The
last column shows the difference in the means of catch share and non-catch share fisheries with
the standard error of the difference. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
† Stock status is available for 47 of the fisheries sampled.
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Table 1.4: Cox Proportional Hazards Model
Standard Model Shared Frailty Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)§ (5)† (6)#
Overfishing status 1.008 1.045∗∗∗ 1.029∗∗ 0.990 1.045∗∗ 1.029
(0.72) (2.93) (2.40) (-0.54) (2.02) (1.15)
Discard rate 0.953∗∗ 0.959∗∗∗ 0.948∗∗∗ 0.942 0.959 0.948
(-2.29) (-2.60) (-3.33) (-1.22) (-1.20) (-1.27)
Bycatch closure 16.98∗∗ 46.92∗∗∗ 17.95∗∗ 2.493 46.92∗∗∗ 17.95∗
(2.31) (2.96) (2.29) (0.71) (2.76) (1.78)
Season length 0.967∗∗∗ 0.965∗∗∗ 0.969∗∗∗ 0.982∗∗ 0.965∗∗∗ 0.969∗∗∗
(-3.23) (-3.18) (-4.41) (-2.09) (-3.27) (-3.33)
TAC Exceeded 0.851 0.477 0.732 1.148 0.477 0.732
(-0.23) (-1.58) (-0.59) (0.15) (-0.91) (-0.35)
Vessels 0.992∗∗ 0.997 0.994 0.999 0.997 0.994
(-2.15) (-1.64) (-1.27) (-0.09) (-0.75) (-0.91)
Sectors 0.259∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗ 0.299 0.252∗∗ 0.346∗∗
(-2.34) (-4.19) (-3.46) (-1.39) (-2.41) (-2.23)
Gini coefficient 0.956∗∗∗ 0.955∗∗∗ 0.959∗∗∗ 0.970 0.955∗∗ 0.959
(-3.32) (-2.96) (-2.91) (-1.31) (-2.12) (-1.61)
Average price 2.611∗∗∗ 0.912 1.416 1.846 0.912 1.416
(3.76) (-0.38) (0.93) (1.29) (-0.18) (0.57)
Aggregate catch 1.026∗∗∗ 1.016∗∗∗ 1.013∗∗∗ 1.012 1.016∗∗ 1.013∗∗
(4.15) (3.99) (5.79) (1.05) (2.44) (2.36)
FMP FE YES YES YES YES
Area FE YES YES
Observations 914 914 914 914 914 914
Fisheries 68 68 68 68 68 68
Catch Share Programs 18 18 18 18 18 18
Log-likelihood -36.06 -31.85 -28.13 -34.51 -31.85 -28.13
AIC 92.12 87.71 82.26 89.01 87.71 82.26
Pseudo R-squared 0.507 0.564 0.615
Hazard ratios reported; t-statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Efron approximation for tied failures.
§ The estimated frailty variance is θ = 7.15 (SE = 6.46). The likelihood-ratio test of H0 : θ = 0
has p-value = 0.039.
† The estimated frailty variance is θ = 2.55E-18 (SE = 2.08E-14). The likelihood-ratio test of
H0 : θ = 0 has p-value = 0.500.
# The estimated frailty variance is θ = 2.08E-18 (SE = 3.99E-14). The likelihood-ratio test of
H0 : θ = 0 has p-value = 0.500.
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Table 1.5: Cox Proportional Hazards Model: Assessed Fisheries
(1) (2)
Stock status 11.21∗∗∗
(6.54)
Overfishing 1.023∗ 1.035∗∗∗
(1.84) (3.02)
Discard rate 0.973 0.968
(-1.30) (-1.51)
Bycatch closure 11.90∗∗ 4.613∗∗∗
(2.50) (2.72)
Season length 0.979∗∗∗ 0.973∗∗∗
(-2.69) (-4.11)
TAC Exceeded 0.853 0.600
(-0.40) (-1.43)
Sectors 0.467∗∗∗ 0.552∗∗∗
(-2.96) (-2.84)
Vessels 0.995∗ 0.990∗∗∗
(-1.73) (-4.10)
Gini coefficient 0.971∗∗ 0.976∗
(-2.35) (-1.94)
Average price 1.246 0.978
(0.83) (-0.11)
Aggregate catch 1.014∗∗∗ 1.019∗∗∗
(8.50) (7.29)
FMP FE YES YES
Area FE YES YES
Observations 612 612
Fisheries 47 47
Catch Share Programs 18 18
Log-likelihood -36.93 -34.48
Pseudo R-squared 0.444 0.481
Hazard ratios reported; t-statistics in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Breslow approximation for tied failures.
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Table 1.6: Cox Proportional Hazards Model: Catch Shares Redefinition
Standard Model Shared Frailty Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)§
Overfishing status 0.999 1.007 0.995 0.979
(-0.09) (0.82) (-0.54) (-1.11)
Discard rate 0.981∗∗ 0.980∗ 0.977 0.961
(-2.09) (-1.83) (-1.56) (-1.11)
Bycatch closure 1.111 1.357 0.890 0.261
(0.14) (0.39) (-0.11) (-1.27)
Season length 0.991∗ 0.991∗ 0.988∗∗ 0.993
(-1.83) (-1.89) (-2.06) (-1.12)
TAC Exceeded 1.538 0.957 1.071 0.727
(0.83) (-0.10) (0.15) (-0.39)
Vessels 0.999 1.002 1.001 1.008∗
(-0.24) (1.04) (0.62) (1.87)
Sectors 0.942 0.867 0.999 4.956∗∗
(-0.30) (-0.93) (-0.01) (2.26)
Gini coefficient 0.984 0.992 0.985 0.976
(-1.55) (-0.75) (-1.09) (-1.24)
Average price 1.817∗∗∗ 0.886 1.225 1.129
(3.61) (-0.53) (0.82) (0.30)
Aggregate catch 1.012 1.007∗∗∗ 1.007∗∗∗ 1.008
(1.48) (4.97) (4.63) (0.98)
FMP FE YES YES
Area FE YES
Observations 899 899 899 899
Fisheries 68 68 68 68
Catch Share Programs 22 22 22 22
Log-likelihood -64.69 -60.39 -51.72 -56.85
AIC 149.4 144.8 129.4 133.7
Pseudo R-squared 0.269 0.318 0.416
Hazard ratios reported; t-statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Efron approximation for tied failures.
§ The estimated frailty variance is θ = 10.75 (SE = 5.84). The likelihood-ratio test of
H0 : θ = 0 has p-value <0.01.
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Table 1.7: Predicted Transitions to Catch Shares
Predicted Considering
Rank Fishery Adoption Year Catch Shares?
1 Norton Sound red king crab 2007 No
2 Central GOA (Kodiak) pollock 2010 Yes
3 Central GOA (Chirkiof) pollock 2010 Yes
4 Central GOA Pacific cod 2011 Yes
5 BS Pacific Ocean perch 2011 No
6 AI Greenland turbot 2011 No
7 BSAI Pacific cod 2013 No∗
8 AI pollock 2022 No
9 Central GOA rex sole 2024 Yes
10 BSAI arrowtooth flounder 2024 No
11 Central GOA deep-water flatfish 2027 Yes
12 Central GOA shallow-water flatfish 2027 Yes
13 Central GOA flathead sole 2028 Yes
14 Central GOA arrowtooth flounder 2031 Yes
15 Pribilof Islands golden king crab 2032 No
Notes: Predicted mean year of catch share program adoption computed from estimated model
parameters from a Weibull regression model and 2010 covariate values.
∗Voluntary cooperative began in August 2010.
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Table 1.8: Weibull vs. Cox Models
Cox Weibull
(1) (2)
Overfishing 1.029∗∗ 0.975
(2.40) (-1.64)
Discard rate 0.948∗∗∗ 0.964
(-3.33) (-1.64)
Bycatch closure 17.95∗∗ 8.233∗
(2.29) (1.93)
Season length 0.969∗∗∗ 0.969∗∗
(-4.41) (-2.09)
TAC Exceeded 0.732 0.877
(-0.59) (-0.28)
Vessels 0.994 1.001
(-1.27) (0.27)
Sectors 0.346∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗
(-3.46) (-2.57)
Gini coefficient 0.959∗∗∗ 0.969
(-2.91) (-1.54)
Average price 1.416 1.227
(0.93) (0.33)
Aggregate catch 1.013∗∗∗ 1.014∗∗∗
(5.79) (4.45)
FMP FE YES YES
Area FE YES YES
Observations 914 914
Fisheries 68 68
Catch Share Programs 18 18
Log-likelihood -28.13 2.667
Pseudo R-squared 0.615
Hazard ratios reported; t-statistics in parentheses;
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Efron approximation for tied failures.
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Chapter 2
Marine Reserves as a
Cooperation Mechanism in
Transboundary Fisheries
2.1 Introduction
An important challenge in achieving sustainable fisheries is the establishment
of effective management in transboundary fisheries.1 Broadly defined, the term
transboundary fishery refers to a stock shared by two or more jurisdictions at
any political scale. Possible management contexts include a stock that occurs
in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of two or more countries or a stock
managed with Territorial User Rights for Fisheries (TURFs), spatial rights to
fishing grounds. Transboundary stocks are vulnerable to overexploitation and
economic inefficiency because spatial connectivity across jurisdictional boundaries
1This chapter is co-authored with Chris Costello, Bren School of Envrionmental Science and
Management, UC Santa Barbara.
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creates an externality in resource extraction. In this paper, we investigate whether
the establishment of marine reserves, areas in which fishing is prohibited, in
transboundary fisheries can mitigate spatial externalities and achieve first-best
economic outcomes.
Economic theory of transboudary fisheries is well known. In the absence of
coordination among jurisdictions sharing a fish stock, competition among juris-
dictions for rents leads to suboptimal resource extraction and economic outcomes
(Levhari and Mirman 1980). Further, the ability of jurisdictions to effectively
bargain with one another to promote cooperation significantly improves equilib-
rium outcomes (Munro 1979). Applied work supports theoretical predictions.
Theoretical and empirical research on specific transboundary fisheries such as the
Arcto-Norwegian cod stock finds economic losses from non-cooperation between
countries consistent with generalized theory (see Sumaila 1997, Armstrong and
Sumaila 2000, Armstrong and Sumaila 2001). Additionally, a recent global study
indicates that transboundary fish stocks shared by multiple countries are system-
atically more exploited compared to those completely controlled by a single nation
(McWhinnie 2009).
The efficient management of a transboundary fishery requires coordination
between jurisdictions to achieve socially optimal harvest levels (Munro et al.
2004). One approach to cooperation is the implementation of cooperative harvest
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agreement between the jurisdictions sharing the fish stock. Some transboundary
fisheries have been effectively managed this way. For example, the Pacific halibut
stock shared between the United States and Canada has been jointly managed
via international treaty since 1923. Under the treaty, both countries set annual
harvest limits in their respective jurisdictions based on the recommendations of
the International Pacific Halibut Commission (IPHC), a bilateral fisheries man-
agement organization. The implementation of rights-based management programs
in both the U.S. and Canadian portions of the fishery during the 1990s further
improved management outcomes (Grafton et al. 2000, Brinson and Thunberg
2013).
Cooperative harvest agreements can achieve socially optimal catch levels, but
may prove costly to negotiate, monitor, and enforce (Barrett 2003). Apart from
costs of negotiating an initial agreement, cooperative harvest agreements require
active management that can be costly to maintain. The IPHC, for example, has an
annual budget of $4.9 million for ‘core activities’, not including research and stock
assessments required to make annual harvest allocation decisions (McCreary and
Brooks 2012). Cooperative harvest agreements also require institutional resources
and infrastructure to monitor and enforce harvest allocations. For these reasons,
cooperative harvest agreements are not widely observed in practice.
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This paper considers an alternative approach to coordination in transboundary
fisheries, the implementation of marine reserves. Our objective is to determine
whether marine reserve implementation can result in first-best economic outcomes
equivalent to cooperative resource extraction. While we do not explicitly model
costs of implementing a cooperative harvest agreement vs. marine reserves, the
implication is that if marine reserves can produce economic outcomes equal or
close to those resulting from cooperative extraction that there may be contexts in
which marine reserves are a practical coordination mechanism.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we provide background on the use
of marine reserves as a fishery management tool. In Sections 3-6, we develop a
game theoretic model of resource extraction in a transboundary fishery shared by
two jurisdictions and compare steady-state equilibrium fishery profit levels under
three management scenarios: 1) cooperative extraction in which each jurisdiction
chooses a harvest rate to maximize total fishery profits, 2) non-cooperative extrac-
tion in which each jurisdiction chooses a harvest rate to maximize own profits,
and 3) marine reserve implementation in which each jurisdiction commits an equal
fraction of fishery area to marine reserves and harvests non-cooperatively in the
remaining open area. Under a set of common biological assumptions, we show
that when marginal harvest costs are independent of stock density, optimally-
sized marine reserves achieve economic outcomes equivalent to those obtained
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under cooperative extraction. We also find that for a range of stock dependent
harvest cost functions, optimally-sized marine reserves can improve economic
outcomes relative to the non-cooperative equilibrium. In Section 7, we illustrate
our theoretical predictions with a numerical application to the Chilean loco fishery.
Section 8 offers conclusions and ideas for further work.
2.2 Marine reserves as a fisheries management
tool
Marine reserves have emerged as a widely-used management tool to protect
marine ecosystems and improve fishery outcomes. A rapidly expanding body
of theoretical and empirical literature in ecology and economics investigates out-
comes associated with establishing marine reserves. The ecology literature focuses
primarily on the efficacy of marine reserves for improving biological outcomes
including stock biomass and density, organism size, and species diversity both
inside (Halpern 2003, Lester et al. 2009) and outside (Halpern et al. 2010) reserves
and generally finds positive outcomes of varying magnitudes.
A significant bioeconomic literature uses integrated population and economic
models to examine the circumstances under which establishing marine reserves is
an economically optimal fishery management strategy. Conceptually, reserves are
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economically optimal when the value derived from biological spillover from closed
areas outweighs the value of fishing these areas. This line of research focuses on the
effects of introducing marine reserves on fishery yields and profits under various
status quo management regimes including open access (e.g., Sanchirico and Wilen
2001b, Sanchirico 2005), limited entry (e.g., Holland and Brazee 1996, Sanchirico
and Wilen 2002b, Smith and Wilen 2003, Sanchirico 2004), sole ownership (e.g.,
Sanchirico et al. 2006, Costello and Polasky 2008). An important conclusion from
this literature relevant to our work is that marine reserves are more likely to
improve economic outcomes in fisheries where the stock is overexploited under
the status quo management regime.
Several existing papers consider the economic outcomes of establishing ma-
rine reserves in a transboundary fishery. Ruijs and Janmaat (2007) develop a
differential game using a bioeconomic metapopulation model of a transboundary
fishery to analyze the effect of marine reserve implementation on fishery biomass
and profits. The analysis relies on a two-country, six-patch numerical example
in which each jurisdiction implements a marine reserve in one patch under the
following management regimes: (i) cooperation, in which jurisdictions jointly
choose the combination of marine reserve placements and effort levels open patches
to maximize profits, and (ii) non-cooperation, in which jurisdictions choose marine
reserve placement and effort levels individually to optimize their own net benefits
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given the effort levels of the other nation. The main result is that the non-
cooperative regime always results in lower profits and biomass levels compared to
the cooperative regime regardless of biological growth and connectivity scenarios.
Costello and Kaffine (2009) present a numerical model of a stylized California
kelp bass fishery managed with 48 hypothetical TURFs and compare outcomes
of marine reserve implementation in a cooperative and non-cooperative system
to cooperative and non-cooperative outcomes in the absence of marine reserves.
They find that whether marine reserves can increase profits and biomass depends
critically on the level of coordination already occurring between TURF owners.
Finally, Molina et al. (2014) modify the two jurisdiction model of Levhari and Mir-
man (1980) to study the effects of different types of spatial connectivity between
jurisdictions on equilibrium marine reserve outcomes.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature on marine reserves and trans-
boundary fisheries in two important ways. First, we examine how the structure of
harvest costs, particularly the degree to which marginal harvest costs depend on
underlying stock density, affects the benefits from marine reserve implementation.
Second, we investigate how the number of jurisdictions sharing the stock affects the
potential gains from implementing marine reserves in a non-cooperative setting.
The next section introduces our theoretical model, which extends the model of
Hastings and Botsford (1999) to a game theoretic setting.
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2.3 A basic model of a transboundary fishery
A fish stock spans the boundaries of two jurisdictions, j ∈ {A,B}.2 Let
α ∈ (0, 1) be the proportion of total fishery area that lies in jurisdiction A. For
ease of exposition, we normalize the area of the fishery to 1 so that the number and
density of adults in the entire fishery are equal. We make the following biological
assumptions:
Assumption 1. Adults are sedentary.3
Assumption 2. Larvae mix uniformly throughout the fishery.
Assumption 3. The density of juveniles that are successfully recruited to the
adult population at any location is given by the function f(d) where d is the density
of juveniles attempting to settle, f ′(d) > 0, f ′′(d) < 0, and f(0) = 0.
The implication of Assumptions 1 and 2 is that all spatial connectivity in the
stock occurs via larval dispersal. In the ecology literature, the larval dispersal
structure described in Assumption 2 is called a common larval pool. Under
Assumption 2, larvae have an equal probability of setting at any location in
the fishery regardless of origin. Assumption 3 describes the nature of density-
dependence in the population dynamics. In particular, the density of juvenile
2Here we model a two jurisdiction scenario. We plan to extend the model to J > 2.
3For our purposes, ‘sedentary’ does not necessarily mean immobile. Rather, following Hilborn
et al. (2004), we define sedentary organisms as “those whose movements are short-range when
compared to the spatial scale of the fishing process (fleet displacement) and/or pelagic larval
dispersal.”
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individuals that successfully reach the adult stage at a given location is an in-
creasing concave function of the density of juveniles transitioning to the adult
stage at that location.
The stock grows according to the following biological rules. Fish reach matu-
rity at age k, at which point they produce m settling juveniles annually. Adult fish
are subject to an annual natural survival rate s. The density of adults vulnerable
to harvest in period t is the sum of the density of juveniles reaching maturity in
the current period and the density of adults that escaped harvest in the previous
period and survive natural mortality. Under Assumptions 2 and 3, the density
of juveniles successfully reaching the adult population in period t is uniform
throughout the fishery and is a function of the sum of the number of adults
in jurisdiction A in time t − k, αnA,t−k, and the number of adults in jurisdiction
B in time t− k, (1−α)nB,t−k, multiplied by the number of juveniles produced by
each adult. We assume that each jurisdiction harvests a fixed fraction Hj ∈ [0, 1]
of adults in its area. The density of adults at the beginning of period t + 1 in
jurisdiction j, nj,t+1, is equal to the fraction of the stock that escapes harvest
multiplied by the density of adults in period t
nj,t+1 = (1−Hj)[f(m(αnA,t−k + (1− α)nB,t−k)) + snj,t]. (2.1)
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In the analysis that follows, we implicitly assume a zero discount rate and focus
on steady-state equilibrium outcomes. In equilibrium, the density of adults in
jurisdiction A satisfies
nA = (1−HA)[f(m(αnA + (1− α)nB)) + snA], (2.2)
and the density of adults in jurisdiction B satisfies
nB = (1−HB)[f(m(αnA + (1− α)nB)) + snB]. (2.3)
Since the area of the fishery is 1, the number and density of adults in the entire
fishery is the same. Therefore, total fishery stock density, n, is the sum of the
number of adults in jurisdiction A and the number of adults in jurisdiction B
given by
n = αnA + (1− α)nB. (2.4)
Equilibrium yield in each jurisdiction is found by multiplying the density
harvested by the proportion of total fishery area contained in the jurisdiction.
Equilibrium yield in jurisdiction A is given by
YA = αHA[f(m(αnA + (1− α)nB)) + snA], (2.5)
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and equilibrium yield in jurisdiction B is given by
YB = (1− α)HB[f(m(αnA + (1− α)nB)) + snB]. (2.6)
We assume that the fishery under consideration is small relative to the total
market and that the quality of the resource is spatially homogeneous, implying
an exogenous ex-vessel price p that is identical across jurisdictions. We also
assume that jurisdictions have identical marginal fishing costs. Annual profits
in jurisdiction A are given by
piA = pYA − α
∫ npreA
npostA
θ
n
dn, (2.7)
where npreA = f(m(αnA + (1 − α)nB)) + snA and npostA = nA are the pre- and
post-harvest adult densities in jurisdiction A. Annual profits in jurisdiction B are
given by
piB = pYB − (1− α)
∫ npreB
npostB
θ
n
dn, (2.8)
where npreB = f(m(αnA + (1−α)nB)) + snB and npostB = nB are the pre- and post-
harvest adult densities in jurisdiction B. The cost function captures harvesting
costs associated with the stock density level and the amount harvested. The
parameter θ ≥ 0 captures the degree to which harvest costs depend on stock
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density. This ‘stock effect’ can be interpreted as the density at which it becomes
unprofitable to fish.4 Multiplying by the proportion of fishery area in each juris-
diction scales costs to the number of fish harvested. For some results, we will also
invoke the following assumption about harvest costs:
Assumption 4. Marginal harvest costs are independent of stock density.
This assumption implies that the stock does not become more costly to harvest
as it becomes more scarce. We represent this assumption by setting θ = 0.
2.4 Benchmark management scenarios
Before considering the implementation of marine reserves, we introduce two
benchmark management scenarios: cooperative extraction and non-cooperative
extraction. We use outcomes under these management scenarios as a basis of
comparison for marine reserve implementation. Throughout, we assume both
jurisdictions have complete, symmetric information, and there is no uncertainty.
2.4.1 Cooperative extraction
We first consider a cooperative extraction management scenario in which ju-
risdictions successfully form a cooperative harvest agreement. The objective of
4Clark and Munro (1975) establish the concept of the marginal stock effect in which the unit
harvest cost is inversely proportional to the stock size.
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the agreement is to maximize the total economic value of the fishery. Under
cooperative extraction, jurisdictions implement a harvest rates that maximize
total fishery profits subject to the evolution of stock in both jurisdictions. The
objective function is given by
pi∗(HA, HB) = max
HA∈[0,1],HB∈[0,1]
piA(HA, HB) + piB(HA, HB), (2.9)
which is subject to the biological constraints Eqs. 2.2 and 2.3. Differentiating
with respect to the harvest fractions gives the following necessary conditions for
an interior solution
∂piA(HA, HB)
∂Hj
+∂piB(HA, HB)
∂Hj
+λj((f(m(αnA+(1−α)nB))+snj) = 0 ∀j (2.10)
where λj is the Lagrange multiplier for the equation of motion for stock in
jurisdiction j. Because jurisdictions coordinate harvest decisions to maximize
the joint profits of both jurisdictions, the spatial externality created by larval
dispersal across jurisdictional boundaries is fully internalized.
2.4.2 Non-cooperative extraction
We also consider the benchmark management scenario of non-cooperative ex-
traction in which each jurisdiction chooses a harvest rate to maximize its own
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profits taking the harvest behavior of the other jurisdiction as given. The objective
function of jurisdiction j is given by
piNCj (Hj, H−j) = max
Hj∈[0,1]
pij(Hj, H−j), (2.11)
which is subject to the biological constraints Eqs. 2.2 and 2.3. Differentiating with
respect to harvest fraction gives the following necessary condition for an interior
solution
∂pij(HA, HB)
∂Hj
+ λj((f(m(αnA + (1− α)nB)) + snj) = 0 (2.12)
where λj is the Lagrange multiplier for the equation of motion for stock in
jurisdiction j.
2.4.3 Benchmark results
Lemma 1. Under Assumptions 1-4, there exists a unique total fishery stock
density n∗ that maximizes total fishery profits under cooperative extraction, and
any pair of jurisdiction harvest rates that obtain n∗ will maximize total fishery
profits.
Proof. Under Assumption 4, total fishery profits are the sum of jurisdiction rev-
enues
pi = pYA + pYB. (2.13)
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Substituting Eqs. 2.5 and 2.6 in for YA and YB gives
pi = pαHA[f(m(αnA + (1− α)nB)) + snA]
+p(1− α)HB[f(m(αnA + (1− α)nB)) + snB]. (2.14)
Under cooperative extraction, jurisdictions choose harvest rates, HA and HB,
jointly to maximize Eq. 2.14 subject to Eqs. 2.2 and 2.3. Solving Eqs. 2.2 and
2.3 forHA andHB and substituting into Eq. 2.14 gives the following unconstrained
optimization problem for jurisdictions choosing stock densities to maximize total
fishery profits:
pi∗ = max
nA,nB
pα[f(m(αnA + (1− α)nB)) + snA − nA]
+ p(1− α)[f(m(αnA + (1− α)nB)) + snB − nB]. (2.15)
Rearranging the total fishery profit equation gives
pi = p[f(m(αnA + (1−α)nB)) + s(αnA + (1−α)nB)− (αnA + (1−α)nB]. (2.16)
Using Eq. 2.4, we can now rewrite total fishery profits as a function of total fishery
stock density,
pi(n) = p[f(mn) + sn− n]. (2.17)
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Eq. 2.17 establishes that we will obtain identical total fishery profits from every
pair of jurisdiction harvest rates, (HA, HB), that solve Eqs. 2.2 and 2.3 for a
pair of jurisdiction stock densities, (nA, nB), that result in the same total stock
density, n, in Eq. 2.4. That is, the total fishery stock density rather than the
location of harvest determines total fishery profits. Eq. 2.17 is a strictly concave
function of n. Therefore, n∗ = argmax{pi(n)} is a unique maximum, and any pair
of jurisdiction harvest rates that result in a pair of jurisdiction stock densities that
gives n∗ will maximize total fishery profits.
Lemma 1 establishes that under the assumption of stock independent har-
vesting costs, the location of harvest does not affect total fishery profits; there
are multiple combinations of jurisdiction harvest rates that maximize fishery
profits. Let C = {(H∗A, H∗B) : n∗A = (1 − H∗A)[f(m(αn∗A + (1 − α)n∗B)) + sn∗A],
n∗B = (1−H∗B)[f(m(αn∗A + (1−α)n∗B)) + sn∗B], n∗ = αn∗A + (1−α)n∗B} be the set
of jurisdiction harvest rate pairs that obtain the profit maximizing total fishery
stock density, n∗, under cooperative extraction. To verify that non-cooperative
extraction will not attain maximal fishery profits, we must show that the pair
of harvest rates jurisdictions choose under non-cooperative extraction does not
belong to the set of fishery profit maximizing harvest rate pairs. To prove this
result requires the following lemma:
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Lemma 2. H∗B is strictly decreasing in H∗A,
∂H∗B
∂H∗A
< 0.
Proof. Substituting the jurisdiction stock density constraints into the total fishery
stock density constraint and solving for H∗B gives the following equation relating
the fishery profit maximizing harvest rates in jurisdiction A and jurisdiction B
H∗B =
α(1−H∗A)[f(m(αn∗A + (1− α)n∗B)) + sn∗A] + (1− α)[f(m(αn∗A + (1− α)n∗B)) + sn∗B ]− n∗
(1− α)[f(m(αn∗A + (1− α)n∗B)) + sn∗B ]
. (2.18)
The partial derivative of Eq. 2.18 with respect to the profit maximizing harvest
rate in jurisdiction A is negative
∂H∗B
∂H∗A
= −α[f(m(αn
∗
A + (1− α)n∗B)) + sn∗A]
(1− α)[f(m(αn∗A + (1− α)n∗B)) + sn∗B]
< 0. (2.19)
Therefore, H∗B is a strictly decreasing function of H∗A.
Lemma 2 establishes that given a pair of jurisdiction harvest rates that max-
imize total fishery profits, if jurisdiction A deviates from its chosen harvest rate,
then jurisdiction B must also change its harvest rate to maintain maximal fishery
profits. That is, for any harvest rate in jurisdiction B, there is only one corre-
sponding harvest rate in jurisdiction A for which fishery profits are maximized.
Proposition 1. For any transboundary fishery satisfying Assumptions 1-4, total
fishery profits under cooperative extraction are strictly greater than total fishery
profits under non-cooperative extraction (pi∗ > piNC).
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Proof. Let (H∗A, H∗B) ∈ C be a pair of jurisdiction harvest rates that main-
tain the profit-maximizing total stock density, n∗, under cooperative extraction.
Let (HNCA , HNCB ) be a pair of jurisdiction harvest rates that emerge under non-
cooperative extraction. By Lemma 2, to prove that total fishery profits under
cooperative extraction are greater than total fishery profits under non-cooperative
extraction it is sufficient to show that HNCA 6= H∗A when the harvest fraction
in jurisdiction B under non-cooperative extraction is fixed at the cooperative
extraction level (HNCB =H∗B). From the first order necessary conditions for co-
operative and non-cooperative extraction, HNCA =H∗A if and only if
∂piB(HA,H∗B)
∂HA
= 0
but ∂piB(HA,H
∗
B)
∂HA
< 0 for all HA > 0, so HNCA 6= H∗A.
Under cooperative extraction, jurisdictions will implement a pair of harvest
rates from C to maximize fishery profits.5 Proposition 1 shows that under non-
cooperative extraction, jurisdictions will choose a pair of harvest rates that are not
an element of the set of fishery profit maximizing jurisdiction harvest rate pairs.
Thus, the total fishery profits that emerge under non-cooperative extraction will
be lower than the profits that emerge under cooperative extraction.
5Though not formally proven here, under cooperative extraction, first-best profits are
obtained.
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2.5 Marine reserve implementation
Thus far, we have shown that total fishery profits under non-cooperative
extraction will fail to reach the first-best economic outcome that is obtained
under cooperative extraction. We now examine fishery profits under an alternative
coordination mechanism called the marine reserve implementation management
scenario in which jurisdictions each agree to protect an equal proportion, r ∈ (0, 1),
of their fishery area in a no-take marine reserve. Each jurisdiction then non-
cooperatively chooses a harvest rate in its remaining open fishery area to maximize
own profits. In this scenario, the density of adults in jurisdiction j at time t + 1
is given by
nj,t+1 = (1−Hj)[f(m(α(1− r)nA,t−k + (1− α)(1− r)nB,t−k + rnR,t−k)) + snj,t].
(2.20)
As in Eq. 2.1, the density of adults in period t+1 in jurisdiction j, is expressed
as the fraction of the stock that escapes harvest in period t multiplied by the
density of adults in period t. Now the density of juveniles successfully recruited
to the adult population, f(·), is a function of the sum of the number of adults
in harvestable area of jurisdiction A in time t− k, α(1− r)nA,t−k, the number of
adults in harvestable area of jurisdiction B in time t − k, (1 − α)(1 − r)nB,t−k,
and the number of adults in marine reserves in time t− k, rnR,t−k, multiplied by
70
Chapter 2. Marine Reserves in Transboundary Fisheries
the number of juveniles produced by each adult, m. In equilibrium, the density
of adults in jurisdiction A satisfies
nA = (1−HA)[f(m(α(1− r)nA + (1− α)(1− r)nB + rnR)) + snA]. (2.21)
Similarly, the density of adults in jurisdiction B satisfies
nB = (1−HB)[f(m(α(1− r)nA + (1− α)(1− r)nB + rnR)) + snB]. (2.22)
The adult density in marine reserves in equilibrium satisfies
nR = f(m(α(1− r)nA + (1− α)(1− r)nB + rnR)) + snR. (2.23)
Total fishery stock density is now given by the sum of the number of adult fish in
jurisdiction A, the number of adult fish in jurisdiction B, and the number of fish
in marine reserves
n = α(1− r)nA + (1− α)(1− r)nB + rnR. (2.24)
As in the non-reserve scenarios, yield in each jurisdiction is found by multiplying
the harvest rate by the fishery area contained in the jurisdiction. Equilibrium
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yield in jurisdiction A is given by
YA = α(1− r)HA[f(m(α(1− r)nA + (1− α)(1− r)nB + rnR)) + snA], (2.25)
and equilibrium yield in jurisdiction B is given by
YB = (1−α)(1−r)HB[f(m(α(1−r)nA+(1−α)(1−r)nB +rnR))+snB]. (2.26)
Profits in the marine reserve are given by
piA = pYA − α(1− r)
∫ npreA
npostA
θ
n
dn, (2.27)
and
piB = pYB − (1− α)(1− r)
∫ npreB
npostB
θ
n
dn, (2.28)
which accounts for the fact that harvest costs now must be scaled by the fishery
area in each jurisdiction outside reserves. In this scenario, the objective function
for jurisdiction j is given by
piRj (Hj, H−j, r) = max
Hj∈[0,1]
pij(Hj, H−j, r) (2.29)
which is subject to the biological constraints Eqs. 2.21, 2.22 and 2.23.
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Proposition 2. For any transboundary fishery satisfying Assumptions 1-4, there
exists an optimal reserve fraction, r*, such that total fishery profits under ma-
rine reserve implementation equal total fishery profits under cooperative extraction
(piR∗ = pi∗).
Proof. By Lemma 1, total fishery stock density determines total fishery profits.
Thus, equivalence in total fishery profits between marine reserve implementation
and cooperative extraction requires a reserve size that induces countries to non-
cooperatively choose harvest rates in their remaining open area that result in
n∗. Suppose HRA = HRB = 1 so that jurisdictions harvest all adult biomass in
their respective jurisdictions in each period so that there is no post-harvest stock
density outside reserves in either jurisdiction, nA = nB = 0. Post-harvest fishery
stock density now consists entirely of reserve biomass
n = rnR, (2.30)
and the equation for equilibrium reserve density reduces to
nR = f(mrnR) + snR. (2.31)
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Substituting n into Eq. 2.31 and solving for r gives the following expression for
reserve size in terms of total fishery stock density and model parameters
r = n(1− s)
f(mn) . (2.32)
Let r∗ be the reserve fraction that solves Eq. 2.32 for n∗. To confirm that
(HRA , HRB , r) = (1, 1, r∗) is an equilibrium in the marine reserve implementation
scenario, we must show two things. First, we must show that 0 < r∗ < 1.
That is, there is some non-zero reserve fraction that gives n∗ in Eq. 2.32. The
numerator of Eq. 2.32 is the equilibrium natural mortality rate of individuals,
and the denominator of Eq. 2.32 is equilibrium recruitment rate of individuals.
Since both expressions are positive for any n > 0 and the equilibrium recruitment
rate of individuals must be greater than the equilibrium natural mortality rate of
individuals when there is fishing mortality in the fishery, 0 < r∗ < 1. Second, we
must show that a harvest rate equal to 1 is a best response for each jurisdiction
at r∗. At the fishery profit-maximizing stock density, n∗, jurisdiction-level profits
are increasing in own harvest rate, ∂pij(Hj ,H−j)
∂Hj
> 0. Thus, neither jurisdiction
has an incentive to lower its harvest rate and Hj = 1 is a best-response for each
jurisdiction.
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2.6 Stock dependent harvest costs
We have shown that, if harvest costs are independent of stock density (As-
sumption 4), marine reserves can achieve first-best equilibrium profits in a trans-
boundary fishery in which jurisdictions choose harvest rules non-cooperatively
(Proposition 2). The assumption of stock independent harvest costs is in many
cases unrealistic (Clark 2010). We now relax Assumption 4 and consider the case
where the unit costs of harvest are inversely proportional to stock density (θ > 0).
When θ = 0, harvest costs could be ignored, so the system we are analyzing
had the helpful property that aggregate profit depends only on the number of fish
harvested, not on the location of that harvest. This property will no longer hold
for θ > 0, because the density of fish in a given jurisdiction affects harvest costs.
Thus, the problem becomes more challenging, and relies on carefully accounting
for the spatial dynamics of stock density. We begin with a result linking stock
density and reserve size.
Lemma 3. Holding yield constant, density is a decreasing function of reserve size.
Proof. For jurisdiction A who faces reserve size r, density is given by: nA =
f(mn) + snA − Y1−r . Since constant yield implies constant n (see Equation 2.17
in the proof to Lemma 1), under the assumption of constant yield, we needn’t
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consider changes in n. Rearranging gives nA =
f(mn)− Y1−r
1−s . Taking the derivative
gives: ∂nA
∂r
= − Y(1−s)(1−r)2 < 0.
This result will prove useful because it establishes that, if you hold yield in the
entire fishery constant, density will decline as the reserve size is increased. This
insight immediately destroys the ability of reserves to reproduce first-best profits
in a non-cooperative fishery in which harvest costs are increasing as stock density
declines.
Proposition 3. When θ > 0, it is not possible to produce first-best profits with
any reserve (r > 0).
Proof. Consider a single owner who chooses yield Y (or equivalently, harvest rate
H) under reserve size r, which produces equilibrium out-of-reserve density nA.
Steady state profit is
pi(Y, r) = pY −
∫ nA+Y/(1−r)
nA
θ
n
dn. (2.33)
Given r, the owner will choose Y to maximize 2.33. Denote the maximized value
by pi∗(Y (r), r), where we explicitly note that optimal harvest will depend on
reserve size. We wish to determine how pi∗ changes with r, as follows
dpi∗(Y (r), r)
dr
= ∂pi
∂r
= ∂pY
∂r
− ∂
∫ nA(r)+Y/(1−r)
nA(r)
θ
n
dn
∂r
. (2.34)
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The first equality is due to the envelope theorem, the second equality is simply
taking the partial derivative and invoking Equation 2.33. Invoking Leibniz’s rule,
denoting n′A ≡ ∂nA(r)∂r , this simplifies to
dpi∗(Y (r), r)
dr
= θ
n′A ( 1nA − 1nA + Y1− r
)
−
Y
(1−r)2
nA + Y1−r
 . (2.35)
Invoking Lemma 3, so n′A < 0, this expression is clearly negative.
Proposition 3 establishes that for any θ > 0, we can no longer rely on optimally-
sized marine reserves to deliver first-best profits. In other words, when θ = 0 the
negative consequences of non-cooperation could be completely mitigated with a
reserve. But when θ > 0 they cannot. Whether a reserve can improve upon the
outcome of non-cooperation (when θ > 0) is the subject of the next two results.
Proposition 4. For sufficiently small θ, non-cooperative profit is maximized with
a reserve r > 0.
Proof. Consider the optimally-sized reserve (under non-cooperative management),
for θ = 0. By Proposition 2 this reserve delivers first-best profit. Now consider
a small increase in θ holding r constant. The increase in θ causes, by continuity,
a marginal decrease in profit. But this second-order effect cannot fully offset the
first order difference identified in Proposition 1.
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Proposition 4 shows that for a sufficiently small stock effect, an optimally sized
reserve can always improve upon the non-cooperative solution. This is good news
and accords with intuition. The proof essentially relies on the fact that there
is a discrete loss from non-cooperative behavior. That loss is entirely offset by
optimally-sized marine reserves when θ = 0 and partially offset when θ is small.
Proposition 4 suggests that even with a stock effect, marine reserves can be
designed to benefit transboundary fisheries. But the logic underpinning the proof
to that result breaks down for large values of θ. To examine what happens
under large values of θ, under which the location of harvest becomes increasingly
important, we define a threshold value of θ. Define by θˆj the size of cost parameter
θ such that for θ > θˆj, jurisdiction j finds it optimal to cease harvesting (because
harvesting would entail a loss in profit), when r = 0. First we will show that the
“large” patch can withstand larger values of the cost parameter.
Lemma 4. θˆA < θˆB ⇔ α < .5
Proof. For patch A the marginal cost of the first unit of yield is: θ
nA(1−r)α and
the marginal benefit of the first unit of yield is p. The value of θ that drives
the marginal profit of the first unit of yield to zero is: θˆA = pnA(1 − r)α.
INCOMPLETE
This gives rise to the following proposition:
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Proposition 5. For sufficiently large θ, adding a reserve always decreases non-
cooperative profit.
Proof. Let r = 0 and without loss of generality, let α < .5, so θˆA < θˆB (see
Lemma 4), and let θ = θˆA. Under that circumstance, HA = 0 and HB > 0 and
jurisdiction B acts as a sole owner who can harvest efficiently in the fraction 1−α
of the ocean he controls. Consider the effects on profit of adding a reserve of size
r > 0. When the reserve is imposed, owner B either: (1) remains a sole owner or
(2) is joined by owner A and the non-cooperative game commences. In case (1)
profits decline by the proof to Proposition 3. Profits in case (2) cannot exceed
profits in case (1) because r is fixed and case (1) is managed by a sole owner while
case (2) is a non-cooperative game. This argument also applies for any θ > θˆA
(and, by continuity, for some θ < θˆA). Thus, for sufficiently large θ, implementing
any reserve r > 0 will decrease joint profits.
Taken together, Propositions 4 and 5 suggest that for sufficiently small values
of the stock effect parameter, a reserve can be designed to increase profits in a
non-cooperative transboundary fishery6 but that for large values of the stock effect
parameter, the optimal reserve size is zero. In the latter case, adding a reserve
would only decrease profit.
6Though never to the first-best level, provided θ > 0 (see Proposition 3).
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2.7 Case study: The Chilean loco fishery
In this section, we illustrate our theoretical predictions with a stylized nu-
merical application to the Chilean loco (Concholepas concholepas) fishery. In
particular, we investigate the extent to which coordination among TURF owners
can improve economic outcomes through implementation of either a cooperative
harvest agreement or marine reserves. The loco is an abalone-like species of
shellfish native to Chile. Loco are sedentary and live close to shore on rocky
substrate up to depths of 40 meters, giving Chile exclusive access to the resource
(Guisado and Castilla 1983). There is a high-value artisanal fishery for loco in
Chile with landings of 2,252 metric tons in 2012 valued at approximately $45
million (IFOP 2012; SUBPESCA 2014).
In 1999, following successive periods of open access, fishery closure, and a failed
quota-based management system, the Chilean government implemented a TURFs
policy.7 Under the management system, fishing jurisdictions called caletas, coastal
areas that serve as operational bases for local artisanal fishing fleets, are granted
exclusive spatial harvest rights to adjacent fishing grounds (Orensanz et al. 2005).8
Although caletas are largely able to effectively manage the resource within their
7In Chile, TURFs are known as “Areas de Manejo y Explotacio´n de Recursos Bento´nicos”
(AMERBs) or sometimes simply as “management areas” (a´reas de manejo).
8Although fishing for loco is prohibited outside TURFs, there is evidence that illegal fishing
in background areas does occur. We do not explicitly account for illegal fishing in this case
study. Instead, we assume all fishery area is contained within TURFs.
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own TURFs, there is concern that a spatial mismatch between the small scale
of TURFs and the medium to large scale of larval dispersal is now resulting in a
“tragedy of the larval commons” in which spatial connectivity creates an incentive
for caletas to set TURF harvest quotas too high relative to the social optimum
(San Mart´ın et al. 2010).
To examine this claim, we present results for a stylized model of the 56
caletas holding loco TURFs in Regions IV-VI, an 800 km stretch of coastline
in central Chile (Figure 2.1). We focus on this area because: 1) it represents an
economically important portion of the overall fishery, comprising 26% of overall
landings between 2000-2010 and 82% of historical yield (Gonza´lez et al. 2006;
SUBPESCA 2012); 2) key biological model parameters are known (see Tam et al.
1996); 3) it contains a loco subpopulation biologically disconnected from the rest of
the stock and with roughly common larval pool dispersal characteristics (Garavelli
et al. 2014).
We use numerical simulation methods to solve for steady state equilibrium
outcomes under the three management scenarios. Table 3.5 reports the model
parameters. For simplicity, we assume all TURFs are of equal size (α = 1/J),
although there is some variation in TURF size.9 We represent the recruitment
function f(·) with the Beverton-Holt stock-recruitment model (Beverton and Holt
9Information about TURF areas can be found here: http://www.sernapesca.cl/index.
php?option=com_remository&Itemid=246&func=fileinfo&id=912.
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1957) given by
f(n) = an
b+ n (2.36)
where n is the adult stock density and a and b are parameters.10
Table 2.1: Model Parameters
Symbol Description Value Source
J Number of jurisdictions (caletas) 10, 20, 56 This paper
α Proportion of fishery area in each jurisdiction 1/J This paper
k Age at maturity 4 Zagal et al. 2001
m Number of settling juveniles 1 This paper
s Adult survival rate 0.75 SUBPESCA 2008
a 1st Beverton-Holt parameter 5.12x107 Tam et al. 1996
b 2nd Beverton-Holt parameter 2.30x107 Tam et al. 1996
p Average price per loco (USD) 1.5 Rosas et al. 2014
θ Stock effect cost parameter 0 - 5x107 This paper
Given the paramterization in Table 3.5, a vector of harvest rates that generates
steady state cooperative profits pi∗ can be found using constrained nonlinear
optimization procedures. Recalling the symmetry among caletas, to find the Nash
Equilibrium vector of harvest rates that gives steady-state non-cooperative profits
piNC , an initial vector of steady-state harvest rates HNC is posited. Taking other
caletas’ steady-state harvest rates HNC−j as given, caleta j chooses a steady-state
harvest rate HNCj to maximize own steady-state profits. Fixed-point iteration
is used on the resulting vector of harvest rates until the harvest rate choice by
10The paramter a is the maximum number of recruits produced, and b is the spawning stock
needed to produce recruitment equal to a/2. The Beverton-Holt model is a commonly used
recruitment function in the marine ecology literature, and it meets the specifications of our
theoretical model by setting m = 1.
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caleta j constitutes a best-response to the harvest-rate choice by all other caletas.
The same procedure is used to find equilibrium profits for the marine reserve
implementation scenario piR, with the addition that caleta j also takes the reserve
size r as given when determining the best-response harvest rate.
Figure 2.2 reports equilibrium profits, yields, harvest rates, and stock biomass
for the stylized model. The cost parameter θ = 58x105 was selected to make non-
cooperative yield in the absence of marine reserves approximately equal to a five-
year average of landings between 2006-2010 (SUBPESCA 2012). In the absence of
marine reserves, annual non-cooperative profits are 25.8% of cooperative profits.
If caletas agreed to implement optimally-sized marine reserves equal to 32.5% of
fishery area, this would increase fishery profits to 96.3% of the estimated profits
under cooperative harvesting behavior. Thus, although the marine reserve policy
does not deliver first-best profits, optimally sized reserves can come quite close to
the cooperative level. Implementing optimally-sized marine reserves also increases
estimated steady state biomass levels by 362%.
Figure 2.3 compares steady state profit outcomes in the three management
scenarios under different values of the stock effect cost parameter θ. First, note
that as θ increases, the economic loss from non-cooperation decreases (pi∗−piNC ↓)
because the incentive jurisdictions have to increase harvest rates to compete for
rents is increasingly offset by the cost of harvest at lower stock densities. Figure
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2.3 verifies our main theoretical results about the stock effect. When harvest
costs are independent of stock density (θ = 0), steady state cooperative profits
pi∗ equal steady state non-cooperative profits with optimally-sized reserves piR∗
(Proposition 2). However, when there is a stock effect (θ > 0), first-best profits
cannot be achieved with marine reserves, piR∗ < pi∗ (Proposition 3). There also
exists a range of stock effect parameter values, 0 < θˆ < 3.2x107, for which marine
reserves can improve on non-cooperative profits without marine reserves, piR∗ >
piNC (Proposition 4). Finally, if the stock effect is too large θˆ ≥ 3.2x107, adding a
marine reserve always decreases non-cooperative profit (Proposition 5). That is,
for θ ≥ θˆ, the optimal reserve size under non-cooperation is zero and piNC = piR∗ .
However, in this range, non-cooperative profits are 90% or more of cooperative
profits, so the loss from non-cooperation is relatively small. In summary, we find
that there exists a broad range of cost parameters for which a marine reserve policy
can improve on non-cooperative economic outcomes, and for stock effect levels at
which marine reserves cannot improve upon the non-cooperative outcome, losses
from non-cooperation are comparatively small.
Finally, examine the effects of decreasing the number of caletas owning TURFs.
Figure 2.4 compares results from allocating the fishery area among 10 or 20 caletas
instead of 56. As the number of caletas decreases, the loss in profits from non-
cooperative behavior declines. Non-cooperative behavior with 20 and 10 caletas
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results in 45.6% and 63.6% of cooperative profits respectively. Regardless of the
number of caletas, the optimal marine reserve fraction remains the same. Thus,
the value of coordination among jurisdictions either through the enactment of a
cooperative harvest agreement or marine reserve implementation increases in the
number of jurisdictions sharing the resource.
2.8 Discussion
Transboundary fisheries present a significant challenge to the achievement of
sustainable and economically efficient marine fisheries. We address the potential
for marine reserves to be used as a cooperation mechanism to produce first-best
economic outcomes in transboudary fisheries. Our theoretical and numerical
results suggest that coordinated implementation of marine reserves can signifi-
cantly improve equilibrium profits, particularly when the number of jurisdictions
sharing the resource is large and the stock effect in harvest costs is low. These
results support global empirical evidence provided by McWhinnie (2009) that the
condition of transboundary fisheries worsens as the number of countries sharing a
fishery increases. Transboundary marine reserves currently exist in regions diverse
as Southeast Asia, Central America, and East Africa, but their primary objective
is to meet marine conservation objectives (UNEP-WCMC 2008). Our work sug-
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gests that marine reserves could also be used to improve economic outcomes in
transboundary fisheries.
Several limitations of our modeling approach deserve emphasis. First, our
results rely on a set of common, but far from universal, biological assumptions.
Further work should be done to assess the robustness of our model under a richer
set of population dynamics such as age structure and other types of adult and
larval connectivity. Second, future work could extend the economic framework
to address a broader range of economic assumptions, such as asymmetric harvest
costs among jurisdictions and consider a fully-dynamic framework with non-zero
discount rates. Third, we do not explicitly consider the transaction costs of either
the cooperative extraction or marine reserve policy approaches. The costs of
designing, monitoring, and enforcing both policy approaches will greatly affect
the practicality of their implementation in a transboundary fishery. We leave
formal consideration of these costs to future work.
As increasing attention is paid to recovering economic losses from mismanaged
fisheries (e.g., Beddington et al. 2007; Arnason et al. 2009), effective approaches
to reforming fisheries management must be developed an implemented. Our
work suggests that marine reserves present a promising management approach
to improve outcomes in transboundary fisheries.
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Figure 2.1: Regions of Chile
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Figure 2.2: Main Results
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Figure 2.3: Varying the Cost Parameter 	  
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
x 107
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Profit vs. Harvest Costs
Stock effect parameter, θ 
Pr
of
it 
(m
ill
io
n 
$)
 
 
Cooperative, π*
Non−cooperative, πNC
Marine Reserve, πR*
  θloco 
89
Chapter 2. Marine Reserves in Transboundary Fisheries
Figure 2.4: Reducing the Number of Jurisdictions
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Do Marine Reserves Improve
Fishery Outcomes? Evidence
from the Santa Barbara Area
Red Sea Urchin Fishery
3.1 Introduction
Spatial management policies are increasingly used for marine resource man-
agement and conservation. No-take marine reserves, areas of the ocean in which
all extractive activities including fishing are prohibited, are a fundamental spatial
management policy instrument.1 Marine reserves now figure prominently into
many marine resource management plans, and they are increasingly viewed as
an important management tool within a suite of policy alternatives to achieve
1Marine reserves are a special case of a broader class of spatial management tools called
marine protected areas (MPAs). MPAs are defined as an area of the ocean where human
activities are restricted to conserve marine life or habitats, whereas marine reserves strictly
prohibit all extractive uses including fishing.
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marine conservation and fishery management goals (see e.g., Beddington et al.
2007; Worm et al. 2009).
As the prevalence of marine reserves increases, evaluation of ex post effective-
ness along biological and economic dimensions becomes increasingly important.
A rich literature at the intersection of ecology and economics examines predicted
outcomes from marine reserves in theoretical and ex ante empirical settings, but
few papers establish ex post causal effects of marine reserve policies on both
ecological and economic outcomes.2
This paper contributes to this literature by developing an integrated bioe-
conomic model to evaluate the biological and economic outcomes of a marine
reserve network implemented in 2003 at California’s Northern Channel Islands
on the Santa Barbara area red sea urchin fishery. We find that eight years after
marine reserve implementation, red sea urchin biomass is 53.7% higher, fishery
yield is 11.3% lower, and fishery revenue is 10.9% lower compared to simulated
outcomes under a counterfactual no-reserve policy.
The concept of marine reserves as a marine policy tool first gained prominence
in the ecology literature in the early 1990s as marine ecologists and conservation
biologists cited the potential for closed areas to achieve marine conservation goals,
including protection of critical habitat and marine populations (Agardy 1994).
2See Conrad and Smith (2012) for a synthesis of existing theoretical and empirical work on
spatial fisheries management and marine reserves.
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Later, economists such as Hannesson (1998) noted that marine reserves could also
offer economic benefits to fisheries if the biomass spillover resulting from a reserve
policy more than offset the opportunity cost of the area lost to fishing.
Marine reserves entered international policy discourse on approaches to marine
resource conservation and management following the adoption of Agenda 21 at the
1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development, which called upon nations
to “to pursue the protection and sustainable development of the marine and
coastal environment and its resources” and encouraged the use of protected areas
to achieve this objective (UNEP 1992). In 2002, the World Summit on Sustainable
Development in Johannesburg further increased the visibility of marine reserves on
the global marine policy agenda by adopting a Plan of Implementation that called
for “the establishment of marine protected areas consistent with international law
and based on scientific information, including representative networks by 2012”
(United Nations 2002). In response to these international calls for action, marine
reserves have been implemented in over 60 countries worldwide and on all seven
continents (PISCO 2011).
The idea that marine reserve policies could confer both ecological and economic
benefits has resulted in a substantial body of bioeconomic literature that models
potential marine reserve policy outcomes along both ecological and economic
dimensions. This literature is primarily focused on identifying “win-win” scenarios
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in which both ecological and economic indicators improve following marine reserve
implementation. While the prediction that marine reserves can improve biological
outcomes is a near universal finding of this line of research, the effect of marine
reserve implementation on economic indicators is mixed. The state of the resource
under the status quo management regime, the spatial distribution of fishing costs,
and the underlying biological structure of the resource emerge as important factors
in determining whether economic conditions improve after reserve implementation
(Sanchirico et al. 2006).
Theoretical contributions to the literature include Sanchirico and Wilen (2001a)
who model marine reserve implementation under open access conditions and find
that it is possible to increase both aggregate biomass and fishery harvests under
certain ecological configurations, namely when the resource exhibits source-sink
dispersal dynamics and the source is designated as a marine reserve. Sanchirico
and Wilen (2002a), model marine reserve implementation in a limited-entry set-
ting and find that win-win outcomes can be produced in cases where the fishery
is operating near open-access effort levels prior to reserve creation, sufficient level
of spatial dispersal exist in the underlying resource population, and the area
of the fishery designated as a reserve has high costs of fishing. Costello and
Polasky (2008) model an optimal management setting and show cases in which
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implementing marine reserves can result in first-best economic outcomes under a
number of bioeconomic conditions.
In addition to the theoretical literature on marine reserves, several papers
implement ex ante empirical analyses of marine reserve policies by calibrating
bioeconomic models to specific fisheries to predict the effects of marine reserve
creation. Smith and Wilen (2003) develop an integrated bioeconomic model
parameterized to the Northern California red sea urchin fishery and find that while
marine reserve creation unequivocally improves biological outcomes regardless of
reserve location, equilibrium yield fails to improve under any simulated reserve
policy that realistically models fisherman behavior. Using a similar modeling
approach, Kahui and Alexander (2008) find comparable results for a New Zealand
abalone fishery. In contrast, Valderrama and Anderson (2007) find that temporally
rotating marine reserves are part of an economically optimal management strategy
for the heavily-exploited U.S. Atlantic sea scallop fishery.
There are comparatively few ex post evaluations of marine reserve polices that
develop a causal link between marine reserve creation and both biological and
economic outcomes. Most ex post marine reserve studies have appeared in the
ecology literature and focus on conservation benefits inside reserves (e.g., biomass,
organism size, and species diversity) and biomass spillovers to adjacent fisheries
(Halpern 2003, Lester et al. 2009, Halpern et al. 2010).
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To our knowledge, there are only two existing ex post empirical studies of
marine reserve policies that establish a causal relationship between marine reserve
implementation and fishery harvests. Smith et al. (2006) and Smith et al. (2007)
examine the introduction of two marine reserves in the Gulf of Mexico multi-
species reef fish fishery. Using panel data methods to evaluate the effects of
both marine reserves on total harvest, Smith et al. (2006) find that yields after
marine reserve implementation are negative and trending downward. Smith et al.
(2007) use a structural modeling approach with Bayesian estimation to evaluate
the effects of one of the marine reserves on gag grouper and find no statistically
significant change in yields after marine reserve implementation.
This paper contributes to this emerging empirical literature on ex post marine
reserve policy evaluation. We calibrate an integrated bioeconomic model of fisher-
men behavior and population dynamics in the Santa Barbara area red sea urchin
fishery.3 We use the calibrated model to evaluate biomass, yield, and revenue
outcomes resulting from the implementation of a marine reserve network at the
Northern Channel Islands in 2003. We accomplish this by comparing observed
outcomes under the reserve policy to simulated outcomes from a counterfactual
no-reserve scenario in which the entire fishery remains open to fishing.
3We adapt the modeling approach of Smith and Wilen (2003) to our empirical setting.
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The urchin fishery provides an ideal setting to conduct an ex post empirical
analysis of marine reserve implementation. It is relatively well-studied, and am-
ple data describing both the fishery and the surrounding physical environment
facilitate detailed modeling of the empirical setting. In addition, the timing of
marine reserve policy implementation in 2003 enables us to leverage eight years
of post-implementation data in our analysis.
Our work advances the literature on ex post marine reserve policy evaluation
in the following ways. First, we carry out the first ex post reserve analysis that
explicitly links an economic model of individual fisherman behavior with a detailed
population model to estimate policy outcomes. Second, our microeconometric
model allows us to gain insight into the effect of reserves on individual fishermen
behavioral responses as well as aggregate changes. Third, our simulation-based
approach enables us to compare outcomes in the same location with and without
marine reserves.
There are a couple of key limitations to the Smith et al. (2006) and Smith
et al. (2007) Gulf of Mexico marine reserve analyses that we are able address in
our work. First, the authors are only able to observe outcomes in the first 4.5
years after marine reserve creation. Gag grouper and many of the other species
in the reef fish fishery are slow-growing species that are regulated with minimum
size limits. If marine reserves ultimately result in biomass spillovers to open areas,
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these gains may not be fully realized in the time horizon evaluated. Our post-
reserve data allow us to observe longer run policy outcomes. Second, the coarse
nature of National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) data requires the authors to
rely on an estimation strategy that treats NMFS statistical areas with reserves
as treatment areas and NMFS statistical areas without reserves as control areas.
This identification strategy requires the strong assumption that the areas are not
biologically connected. Our work is able to explicitly model biological connectivity
between discrete patches.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the
empirical setting including the Santa Barbara area red sea urchin fishery and
the marine reserve network implemented at the Northern Channel Islands in
2003. Section 3 describes the empirical approach including the economic model
of fishermen behavior, the biological metapopulation model, and the link between
the two. Section 4 introduces the data sources and presents the empirical results.
Section 5 concludes.
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3.2 Empirical setting: The Santa Barbara area
red sea urchin fishery and Channel Islands
Marine Protected Areas Network
The red sea urchin (Strongylocentrutus franciscanus) is a long-lived inverte-
brate species inhabiting rocky substrate in kelp forests along the Pacific Coast
from Baja California to Alaska.4 Red sea urchins are harvested for their roe
(gonads) and marketed as the sushi product uni.
A key feature of urchin fisheries is that the unit price is largely determined
by product quality, which is characterized by texture, freshness, color, and taste.
The quantity and quality of roe found in urchins has a cyclical component based
on the organism’s annual reproductive cycle. In the Santa Barbara area, urchin
gonadosomatic index (GSI), the ratio of gonad mass to total body mass, generally
peaks from September-December, and quality typically peaks in December (Teck
et al. 2015). Figure 3.1 shows recent monthly average prices in the fishery with
peak prices typically occurring from September-December. In addition to the
annual reproductive cycle, food availability is a key determinant of roe quantity
and quality. Giant kelp (Macrocystis pyrifera) is the primary food source for
4Background information in this section is largely drawn from CDFW (2004).
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California urchins, and fishermen use the presence of kelp beds as a visual indicator
of productive fishing locations.
In California, the northern fishery (extending from south to north from Half
Moon Bay to the Oregon border) and southern fishery (extending from south
to north from the Mexican border to Point Conception) are managed separately
by the California Fish and Game Commission and the California Department of
Fish and Wildlife (CDFW). The southern fishery can be further subdivided into
the San Diego, Los Angeles, and Santa Barbara area fisheries, with little overlap
in fishing grounds occurring between the Santa Barbara area fishery and fishing
activity to the south. The Northern Channel Islands (San Miguel, Santa Rosa,
Santa Cruz, and Anacapa), the primary fishing grounds for the Santa Barbara
area fishery, are widely regarded as producing the highest quality uni worldwide,
and this has led to a consistently high-value fishery.
The Santa Barbara area fishery is based out of three ports: Santa Barbara,
Oxnard, and Ventura. Figure 3.2 displays annual landing trends by port. Since
the mid-1990s, annual landings in Ventura have been less than 5 percent of total
landings. Most fishing activity occurs at the Northern Channel Islands with some
additional fishing along the mainland from Point Conception to Malibu and at
San Nicholas and Santa Barbara Islands.
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The urchin fishery is a dive fishery. Divers harvest urchins from kelp beds at
depths of 30 meters or less, using a picking rake to dislodge urchins from hard
substrate and place them in mesh bags. They conduct their work using a “hookah
rig,” a scuba regulator attached to a long hose hooked up to an air compressor on
the boat. Diver teams typically consist of 1-3 divers and a tender who monitors the
air compressor and air hoses and assists the divers in lifting bags of urchins onto
the boat. Boats are small, averaging less than 30 feet, and are designed for speed
and the ability to carry large loads of urchins in potentially inclement weather
conditions. Fishing trips are typically single-day, although a small percentage of
multi-day trips occur.5
Weather conditions are a crucial determinant of both diver participation in
the fishery and location choice on a given day. Both wind and wave conditions
affect whether divers are able to reach fishing sites, particularly those located at
the Channel Islands, and affect the fishing process once divers have reached a
location. Anecdotally, divers report a lower propensity to go fishing, and a higher
propensity to dive in more sheltered areas if they do fish, in the presence of high
winds, high waves, and long wave periods (the time elapsed between wave crests).
Wave direction is a key determinant of location choice. When waves are arriving
from the north or northwest, divers are more likely to fish along coastlines facing
5Multi-day trips are typically no more than two days in duration.
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south, and when waves are arriving from the south, they are more likely to fish
in locations facing north.
Commercial urchin fishing in the Santa Barbara area began in 1971 as part of
a National Marine Fisheries Service program to develop fisheries for underutilized
marine species. Ex-vessel prices and the number of divers increased throughout the
1970s and 1980s as demand for uni in the Japanese market increased, and landings
grew steadily with the exception of years featuring strong El Nin˜o events.6 Warmer
ocean temperatures during these periods depressed kelp populations, leading to
lower product quality and harvests.
In the late 1980s, concern about the sustainability of the fishery led the
Fish and Game Commission to establish more formal fishery regulations. These
regulations included a moratorium on the issuance of new diver permits in 1987,
a formal restricted access program implemented in 1989, and an effort reduction
program established in 1990 that currently requires 10 permits to be retired for
each new entrant to reach a capacity goal of 300 divers statewide.
In addition to the limited entry program, the Fish and Game Commission
also uses a minimum size limit and temporal closures to manage the fishery, but
there is no total allowable catch (TAC). The structure of the temporal closures
6Historically, up to 90 percent of processed uni was exported to the famed Tsukiji fish market
in Japan. More recently, a rise in domestic demand has resulted in a decrease in export rates
to around 20 percent (Teck et al. 2015).
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is somewhat unusual. Instead of the common method of opening the fishery on
the same date each year and closing the fishery once a TAC has been reached,
the fishery has regulated open and closed days that vary by month. Under the
current regulation, the fishery is closed on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday from
June through October.7 Table 3.1 provides an overview of the major management
actions implemented in the fishery.
On April 9, 2003, the California Fish and Game Commission established a
network of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) in state waters around the Channel
Islands.8 The Channel Islands Marine Protected Area Network closed 13% of
Santa Barbara area urchin fishing grounds at the Channel Islands and 10% of
fishing grounds area-wide.9
7This management approach evolved to satisfy commercial divers in the late 1980s, who
believed that consistent delivery of product to the Japanese market was essential to maintain
competitiveness with other urchin fisheries.
8As established in 2003, the Channel Islands Marine Protected Area Network consisted of ten
marine reserves where all commercial and recreational harvest was prohibited and two marine
conservation areas that allowed limited take of lobster and pelagic fish. For the purpose of our
study, all 12 areas are marine reserves because they prevent all take of urchin. In July 2007,
the federal govenment extended some of the MPA boundaries from three nautical miles (the
limit of state jurisdiction) to six nautical miles, and established one new MPA, the Footprint
Marine Reserve, in federal waters south of Anacapa and Santa Cruz islands. This policy change
did not impact the urchin fishery because all urchin fishing occurs in nearshore State waters.
Additionally, in a separate initative in 1999, the State government passed the California Marine
Life Protection Act (MLPA) requiring the reevaluation of all existing MPAs and the potential
design of new MPAs that together function as a statewide network. Design and implementation
of a statewide MPA network under the MLPA was carried our at a regional level. The South
Coast Region (from Point Conception to the Mexican border) policy went into effect after
our analysis period on January 1, 2012. The policy retains the 2003 Channel Islands MPA
network evaluated in this paper and adds some additional MPAs at mainland locations. Further
information on the MPA regulations resulting from MLPA implementation can be found here:
http://www.dfg.ca.gov/marine/mpa/index.asp.
9We define urchin fishing grounds, or fishable area, as the area of hard-bottom substrate at a
depth of <30 meters. Area-wide refers to all fishing locations in Figure 3.5, and Channel Islands
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The policy was the result of a four-year process of public meetings and discus-
sion and scientific analysis led by a multi-stakeholder Marine Reserves Working
Group (MRWG) consisting of representatives from the federal and state agencies
with jurisdiction in the planning region, commercial and recreational fishermen,
and representatives from environmental groups (Airame´ and Ugoretz 2008). In
addition, a 15-member Science Advisory Panel and a five-member socioeconomic
panel were formed to assist the MRWG in their analysis of potential MPA network
sizes and configurations. The MRWG based its recommendations the ability
of the resulting MPA network to fulfill five goals including: (1) the protection
of ecosystem biodiversity, (2) the attainment of sustainable fisheries, (3) the
achievement of long-term socioeconomic viability, (4) the protection of natural and
cultural heritage, (5) provision of educational opportunities to increase awareness
and stewardship of marine resources (Airame´ et al. 2003). The multi-stakeholder
process thus led to the establishment of an MPA network that attempted to max-
imize several management objectives including, but not exclusively, sustainable
fisheries management.10
Figure 3.3 presents aggregate trends in the Santa Barbara area urchin fishery
before and after marine reserve implementation. During the pre-reserve period,
refers to Anacapa, Santa Cruz, Santa Rosa, San Miguel, San Nicholas, and Santa Barbara
Islands (fishing locations 8-22 in Figure 3.5).
10In addition, the red urchin was only one of several fisheries including spiny lobster, abalone,
and rockfish considered in the determining the design of the MPA network.
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the number of divers, fishing trips, yields, and ex-vessel prices were all on a down-
ward trajectory, which is attributable to a weak Japanese market, competition
from other urchin fisheries worldwide, and strong Nin˜o events along the California
coastline. After the reserve policy went into effect, prices continued to decline
before stabilizing in 2007. The number of divers continued to decline, but at
a slower rate. The number of fishing trips and aggregate yields increased from
2002-2004, but are relatively stable in the post-reserve period.
These aggregate trends do not immediately reveal the effect of the marine
reserve policy on fishery outcomes. In the analysis that follows, we calibrate
an integrated bioeconomic model of urchin diver behavior and urchin population
dynamics using an 11 year dataset (January 2000 - June 2011) spanning the pre-
and post-reserve period. We use the calibrated model estimate the effect of marine
reserve implementation on fishery biomass, yield, and revenue outcomes. The next
section presents our modeling approach.
3.3 Bioeconomic model
Our bioeconomic model consists of a discrete choice fishing behavior model
and a spatially explicit population model linked via a mapping between fishing
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trips estimated from the fishing behavior model and the fishing mortality rate
applied in the population model.
3.3.1 Fishing behavior model
The economic model captures urchin divers’ daily fishing decisions. Based on
our knowledge of the fishery, we assume fishing decisions take the nested structure
in Figure 3.4. In particular, on each day that the fishery is open (choice occasion),
a diver decides whether to fish (the participation-level decision), and, conditional
on participation, where to fish (the location-level decision).
We model an urchin diver’s participation and location decision jointly in a
random utility framework. Following McFadden (1978), we assume that on each
choice occasion a diver will choose the utility maximizing alternative. The utility
of diver i choosing alternative j on choice occasion o is given by
Uijo = Vijo + ijo = f(X io,Z ijo;β) + ijo (3.1)
i = 1, ..., I; j = 0, ..., J ; o = 1, ..., O
where X io is a vector of choice-specific variables that may vary over divers and
choice occasions but not across alternatives, Z ijo is a vector of alternative-specific
variables that may vary over divers, choice occasions, and fishing locations, and
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β is a vector of unknown parameters. We estimate the model using a Repeated
Nested Logit (RNL) model similar to the framework described in Herriges and
Phaneuf (2002). We assume that the vectors i·o ≡ (i0o, ..., ijo) are independently
and identically distributed across individuals and choice occasions and are drawn
from a generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution.
The corresponding choice probabilities associated with diver i choosing alter-
native j on choice occasion o are given by
Prijo =

1− Fio j = 0,
FioPrijo|fish j = 1, ..., J
(3.2)
where j = 0 denotes the choice not to fish,
Fio =
[
J∑
k=1
exp(Viko/θ)
]θ
[
J∑
k=1
exp(Viko/θ)
]θ
+ exp(Vi0o)
(3.3)
is the probability that diver i chooses to fish on choice occasion o, and
Prijo|fish =
exp (Vijo/θ)
J∑
k=1
exp(Viko/θ)
j = 1, ..., J (3.4)
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is the probability that diver i chooses to fish in location j conditional on the
decision to fish on choice occasion o. In Equations 3.3 and 3.4, θ is the dissimilarity
parameter for the fish nest, which measures the degree of correlation among
unobserved portions of utility for fishing location alternatives. This parameter
must be between zero and one for the model to be consistent with random utility
maximization, and the model reduces to a multinomial logit for the case where
θ = 1.
3.3.2 Population model
The population model tracks urchin population dynamics. We develop a
metapopulation model consisting of P discrete age-structured subpopulations
(patches) linked by a larval dispersal matrix. We assume adults are sedentary and
that all dispersal between patches occurs via larval movement. The subpopulation
in each patch has a size structure described by a von Bertalanffy growth function
such that the length L of an individual of age a is given by
La = L∞(1− e−ka) (3.5)
where a is a monthly time index from 1 to amax and L∞ and k are parameters
representing the terminal size of an individual and organism growth rate respec-
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tively.11 Allometric parameters α and β convert length to weight as follows
wa = αLβa (3.6)
Individuals become vulnerable to fishing mortality once they reach the regulated
fishery-wide minimum size limit LMSL. Accounting for both natural and fishing
mortality, the number of individuals A in patch p that survive the transition from
age a to age a+ 1 is given by
Ap,a+1 =

Ap,ae
−m if La < LMSL
Ap,ae
−(m+fp) if La ≥ LMSL
(3.7)
where m is the instantaneous natural mortality rate and fp is a patch-specific
instantaneous fishing mortality rate. Fishery yield Y for a given month is the
summed biomass of harvested individuals from all age classes in all patches and
is given by
Y =
P∑
p=1
[
fp
m+ fp
(1− e−(m+fp))
amax∑
a=1
waAp,a
]
∀ La ≥ LMSL (3.8)
11We assume that no individuals live beyond amax. In addition, all biological model
parameters could be specified to be patch-specific, but based on available biological information
and previous modeling work in this fishery, we specify all parameters to be spatially constant
with the exception of the fishing mortality rate and one parameter in the settler-recruitment
relationship.
109
Chapter 3. Do Marine Reserves Improve Fishery Outcomes?
In Equation 3.8, patch-level yield is computed by first calculating patch-level
vulnerable biomass (the sum over all age classes of the biomass of individuals
satisfying the minimum size limit). Vulnerable biomass is then multiplied by
the fraction of individuals subject to either natural mortality or fishing mortality,
1−e−(m+fp), and the proportion of mortality attributed to fishing mortality, fp
m+fp ,
to determine patch-level yield. Patch-level yield is then summed over all patches
to determine total fishery yield.
The metapopulation model also accounts for reproduction through compu-
tation of egg production and larval dispersal, settlement, and survival. Egg
production is assumed to occur in January, and it is determined after adult survival
has been computed.12 We assume an exponential relationship between organism
length and egg production for mature individuals. Egg production in patch p is
given by the sum of egg production from mature individuals in each age class as
follows
ep =
amax∑
a=1
γxδAp,a where x =

La if La ≥ Lmat
0 if La < Lmat
(3.9)
where γ and δ are fecundity parameters. After spawning occurs, the resulting
larvae enter the water column and are distributed across the system by oceano-
12There is evidence that spawning occurs throughout the winter months (Leet et al. 2001),
but for modeling purposes, we assume all egg production occurs in January.
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graphic currents before attempting to settle on rocky substrate and recruit to the
adult population. The probability of larvae dispersing from one patch to another
in the system is given by the P × P larval dispersal matrix D, where each element
Dij represents the probability of a larvae originating in patch i being transported
to patch j. The spatial distribution of larvae attempting to settle after dispersal
is given by
l = eD (3.10)
where e is a 1 × P vector of larvae originating from each patch as computed in
Equation 3.9, and l is a 1 × P vector containing the number of larvae attempting
to settle in each patch post-dispersal. The number of larvae that successfully settle
and recruit to the adult population in patch p is determined by a Beverton-Holt
settler-recruitment function
rp =
ηlp
1 + νplp
(3.11)
where rp denotes the number of recruits in patch p, η is a parameter representing
the maximum settler survival rate, and νp is a patch-specific parameter that sets
the maximum recruitment in a patch. Upon successful settlement, recruits in each
patch become the first age class.
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3.3.3 Linking the fishing behavior and population models
We link the fishing behavior and population models via the following system
of equations relating Tripsjt, the number of predicted fishing trips to location j
in month t, to the resulting patch-specific fishing mortality rate fpt
Tripsjt =
N∑
n=1
Ot∑
o=1
dntPrnjo (3.12)
Tripspt =
J∑
j=1
hpjtTripsjt (3.13)
fpt = qtTripspt (3.14)
Equation 3.12 calculates Tripsjt by summing over all ports and choice occasions
the product of dnt, the number of active divers in port n during month t and Pnjo,
the probability of a diver from port n choosing to fish in location j on choice
occasion o, as specified in Equation 3.4. Equation 3.13 maps predicted trips to
locations in the fishing behavior model Tripsjt to predicted trips to patches in the
population model Tripspt by weighting trips to a given fishing location by hpjt,
the proportion of habitat area available to fishing in location j in month t that
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occurs in patch p.13 Equation 3.14 scales fishing trips to a fishing mortality rate
via a catchability coefficient qt, which is potentially time-variant.
3.4 Data and empirical results
3.4.1 Estimating the fishing behavior model
The choice set
Our discrete choice modeling approach requires us to define the set of fishing
location alternatives available to divers. We do this using the CDFW Commercial
Landing Receipt Database, which contains individual records of urchin landings
commonly referred to as “fish tickets.” Fish ticket information includes date and
port of landing, diver identification number, vessel identification number, buyer
identification number, catch, unit price, and the CDFW statistical reporting
block where the fish were caught. Our fishing location choice set consists of 22
alternatives that cover 98% of total fish tickets recorded during our study period.
Each alternative corresponds to a either single CDFW reporting block, or, in
lightly fished areas, two or three adjacent blocks aggregated to reflect natural
13This mapping allows us to use different geometries in the fishing behavior and population
models. In particular, we track subpopulations inside and outside of reserves, which occur at
a finer spatial sclae than we observe fishing behavior. Habitat area is computed using the kelp
area dataset described in Section 3.4.1.
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habitat boundaries. Figure 3.5 presents a map of the study space including the
location of fishing ports, marine reserves, and the fishing location choice set.
Data
We construct a dataset of 434,590 diver-choice occasions spanning January
2000 - June 2011 to estimate the fishing behavior model. Choice occasions corre-
spond to the days the fishery is open under CDFW regulations. There are 3,032
open days during our study period. We observe 60,082 individual fishing trips over
this period, meaning that, on average, divers fish on 13.8% of choice occasions.
Table 3.2 presents diver trends during our study period. During this time,
the number of active divers in the fishery fell from 209 to 108. The average
number of patches fished increased moderately from 5.0 in 2000 to 6.2 in 2011.
There was a more pronounced increase in average trips taken – 24.6 in 2000
to 44.5 in 2011 – including a jump between 2002-2004, coinciding with marine
reserve implementation but more likely attributable to an increase in the number
of regulated fishery open days in 2003.
Data for the explanatory variables come from several sources. Choice-specific
variables include weather data on wind speed, wave height, and wave period,
which come from the National Data Buoy Center.14 We aggregate the weather
14Information on buoys including maps and downloadable data can be found here: http:
//www.ndbc.noaa.gov.
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data to 12-hr averages between midnight and noon on each choice occasion. We
define a weekend dummy variable, which takes the value 1 on Friday, Saturday,
and Sunday, to capture divers’ lower observed propensity to fish on those days
(see Table 3.3).
Alternative-specific variables include great circle distance from each port to
the centroid of fishable area in each patch. We define fishable area as the hard
substrate area within 30m bathymetric contours at the patch level, and inside
and outside marine reserves where relevant. We use several shapefiles provided
by the CDFW Marine Region GIS Unit including nearshore bathymetric contours
and statistical reporting block and marine protected area boundaries to determine
fishable area. We construct a measure of expected revenue from fish ticket data.
We define expected revenue as the product of a 90-day backward average of patch-
level catches and a 30-day backward average of fishery-wide prices. Kelp area data
come from the UCSB Landsat Kelp Canopy Dataset, a high spatial resolution time
series of giant kelp (Macrocystis pyrifera) canopy area.15 The data were collected
by the Landsat 5 TM satellite sensor on a 16-day repeat cycle with a 30m spatial
resolution. We aggregate the raw data to a monthly timescale and to the patch
level, including accounting for kelp area inside and outside reserves where relevant.
15See http://www.icess.ucsb.edu/˜kyle/Site/Landsat.html and Cavanaugh et al. (2011)
for a detailed description of the Landsat Kelp Canopy Dataset.
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Table 3.4. presents descriptive statistics for variables in the discrete choice
model. Further information on the fishing behavior model dataset appears in
Appendix B.1.1.
Nested logit estimates
Table 3.6 reports the results of our preferred nested logit specification using
the full sample of 434,590 diver choice occasions. Variables that are choice-specific
include the three weather variables (wind speed, wave height, and wave period)
and the weekend dummy variable. These variables, along with the constant term,
enter the model at the participation-level. Variables that are alternative-specific
include distance to each patch, expected revenue, and kelp area.
All coefficient estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level and are
of expected sign. Specifically, we find the utility of fishing is lower in poor
weather conditions and on the weekend. We also find that the utility of fishing
a patch is decreasing in distance and increasing expected revenue and kelp area.
Since the dissimilarity parameter θ is between zero and one (and significantly
different from one), we conclude that the model is consistent with random utility
maximization and that the nested logit specification is superior to a multinomial
logit specification.
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Appendix Figure B.1 presents monthly observed trips and predicted trips from
the fishing behavior model. Appendix Figure B.2 presents the corresponding
residuals. Appendix Figure B.3 presents monthly observed trips and predicted
trips for a selection of individual patches. Our trip estimates are noisy. There
is also some evidence that we tend to over-predict trips before and under-predict
trips after the marine reserve policy.
In future work, we will attempt to improve the fishing behavior model predic-
tions. We may be able to improve the functional form specification by incorpo-
rating a wave direction variable, to account for the fact that divers likely choose
fishing locations that protect them from waves. We could also use marine fuel
prices to create a dynamic measure of travel costs instead of using distance as a
static proxy measure. Finally, there is some evidence of measurement error in our
ex-vessel price data (see Appendix B.1.1), which we will work to resolve.
3.4.2 Population model
The metapopulation model requires three inputs: 1) a set of patches, 2) a set
of parameter values, and 3) an initial population matrix.
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Patches
The population model tracks urchin subpopulations in the reserve and non-
reserve areas of the location alternatives in the fishing behavior model. Figure 3.6
presents the 32 patches in the population model. Patches 1-22 are composed of
the areas in the fishing location alternatives presented in Figure 3.5 that are open
to commercial fishing throughout the study (non-reserve patches), and patches
23-32 are composed of areas that become marine reserves in April 2003 (reserve
patches).
There is a 1-to-1 mapping between fishing location alternatives that do not
contain a marine reserve (i.e., 1-7, 12, 15, 16, 20, and 22) and corresponding
patches in the population model. That is, in Equation 3.13, hpjt = 1 for j = p
and zero otherwise.
There is a 1-to-2 mapping between fishing location alternatives where marine
reserves are implemented (i.e., 8-11, 13-14, 17-19, and 21) and corresponding
patches in the population model. For example, fishing location alternative 10 is
composed of patch 10, a non-reserve patch, and patch 25, a reserve patch. After
marine reserve implementation, hpjt = 0 for reserve patches and hpjt = 1 in non-
reserve patches for j = p; all fishing takes place in non-reserve patches. Before
marine reserve implementation, we split trips to a fishing location alternative in
a given month between corresponding reserve and non-reserve patches according
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to the proportion of the fishing location’s habitat (kelp) area lying in each patch.
This assumption allows us to estimate fishing mortality rates at the scale of Figure
3.6, although we only observe fishing decisions at the spatial scale of Figure 3.5.
Parameter values
Table 3.5 reports the biological model parameter values. We adopt growth,
natural mortality, and allometric length-weight parameters that have previously
been used to model the Southern California red urchin population (i.e., CNRA
2009, Rassweiler et al. 2012, Rassweiler et al. 2014) and the fecundity parameters
reported in Campbell et al. (1999). We derive the larval dispersal matrix using
numerical output from the Regional Ocean Circulation Modeling System (ROMS)
and Lagrangian particle-tracking model described in Mitarai et al. (2009).16 We
estimate patch-specific Beverton-Holt settler-recruitment parameters using the
methodology of Rassweiler et al. (2012), which allows for heterogeneity in maxi-
mum recruitment across patches based on the amount of available urchin habitat.17
16ROMS models ocean circulation patterns from 1996-2003, and our larval connectivity
matrix represents the average connectivity probabilites for these years. The model was
calibrated assuming a December-March spawning season and a seven-week pelagic larval
duration consistent with scientific knowledge of red urchin reproduction and early life history
characteristics (Leet et al., 2001; Rogers-Bennett et al., 1995).
17Here habitat is measured as the area of hard substrate from 0-100m derived from CDFW
Marine GIS Unit Predicted Substrate shapefiles, consistent with the urchin habitat and depth
range used in the MLPA Analysis for the South Coast Region (CNRA 2009)
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Initial population matrix
Simulating urchin population dynamics requires us to have an estimate of
age-structured patch-level biomass at the beginning of our study. There is no
stock assessment for this fishery, and thus underlying population levels are not
known. We therefore construct an estimate of age-structured patch-level biomass
in January 2000 using the methods described in Appendix B.1.2.
3.4.3 Calibrating the bioeconomic model
We calibrate the model by estimating qt using maximum likelihood estimation.
In particular, we assume qt has the following structure
qt =

q0 if tpost ≤ 0
q1 + φtpost if tpost > 0
(3.15)
where q0 is a pre-reserves catachability coefficient, q1 is a post-reserves catacha-
bility coefficient, φ is a post-reserves catchability time trend, and tpost indexes the
number of months since marine reserves were implemented (i.e., tpost = 1 in April
2003).
We assume q is constant before reserves are implemented. The rationale for
this assumption is that the composition of divers participating in the fishery was
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relatively stable, and there are no major known changes in regulatory policy,
fishing technology, or diver skill during this period. Two major policy changes
occurred in Spring 2003, which lead to the assumption of a discrete jump in the
value of q accompanied by a time trend. First, reserves were implemented in April
2003, which could lower q in the short term, if divers fished primarily in reserve
areas and were forced to search for new productive fishing grounds. Second, the
number of days open to urchin fishing under CDFW regulations increased by
five weeks beginning in May 2003, which could increase q, if divers were better
able to choose to fish during favorable conditions. The time trend φ allows for
intertemporal fishing behavior adjustment in either scenario.18
Figure 3.7 presents simulated monthly yields from the calibrated model along-
side observed yields. Figure 3.8 presents the corresponding residuals. The cali-
bration is somewhat noisy, but generally tracks annual cyclical variation in yields.
We estimate q0 = 2.56E-4, q1 = 3.89E-4, and φ= 1.85E-5. Since q1 > q0, we
assume the change in q is driven by the change in number of open fishing days,
although the relative effects of each policy change merit further investigation.
18We also considered a quadratic time trend, but model fit was diminished.
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3.4.4 Counterfactual simulation results
We evaluate biological and economic outcomes under the marine reserve policy
by simulating a status quo counterfactual scenario in which marine reserves are not
implemented in April 2003, and all areas remain open to fishing. To simulate the
counterfactual scenario, we use observed trips in the pre-reserve period (January
2000 - March 2003) and predicted trips in the post-reserve period (April 2003
- June 2011), estimated using the amount of kelp area available in each fishing
location had reserves not been implemented. Since the estimate of q1 identified
in the calibration for post reserve implementation period appears to be driven by
the change in the number of open fishing days, not the reserve policy, we use the
same q parameter estimates in the counterfactual simulation exercise.
We find that the marine reserve policy decreases fishery yields and revenues
relative to the simulated status quo, although these losses are generally modest.
Figure 3.9 presents observed annual fishery yields and simulated annual yields in
the counterfactual no-reserve scenario beginning in 2003. In 2010, eight years after
marine reserve implementation, observed fishery yield is 0.78 million pounds or
11.3% lower than the simulated counterfactual yield. Yields are on average 10.7%
lower during the entire 2003-2010 post-reserve period relative to the counterfac-
tual. Figure 3.10 presents observed annual fishery revenues and simulated annual
revenues in the counterfactual no-reserve scenario beginning in 2003. We calculate
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simulated annual revenues by multiplying simulated monthly yields by the average
monthly price and aggregating by year. In 2010, observed fishery revenues are
$0.47 million or 10.9% lower than the simulated counterfactual revenues. Revenues
are on average 10.7% lower during the entire 2003-2010 post-reserve period relative
to the counterfactual.
Our yield and revenue results are consistent with Smith and Wilen (2003) who
find that hypothetical marine reserves implemented in the northern California
urchin fishery never confer fishery benefits, regardless of location. Our findings
are also consistent with other recent ex post empirical work that finds no evidence
of economic benefits of marine reserve policies (e.g., Smith et al. 2006, 2007).
We also estimate biomass outcomes. We never directly observe biomass, so we
must simulate it. We simulate biomass resulting from the marine reserve policy
using observed trips, and we simulate biomass in the counterfactual scenario using
the time series of observed trips during the pre-reserve period and predicted trips
in the no-reserve scenario during the post-reserve period. Figure 3.11 reports
our biomass results. Simulated biomass under the marine reserve policy is sub-
stantially higher than simulated biomass in the counterfactual scenario. In 2010,
simulated mean annual biomass is 20.0 million pounds or 53.8% higher than the
simulated counterfactual biomass. Biomass is on average 24.3% lower during the
entire 2003-2010 post-reserve period relative to the counterfactual. Our biomass
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findings are consistent with the ecological literature, which generally finds that
spatial closures increase population biomass (Halpern 2003, Lester et al. 2009,
Halpern et al. 2010).
3.5 Conclusion
Using a bioeconomic model that maps individual fisherman behavior to aggre-
gate outcomes, we evaluate the implementation of a network of marine reserves
in April 2003 on biological and economic outcomes in the Santa Barbara red
sea urchin fishery. Preliminary results indicate that eight years after reserve
implementation fishery biomass is higher, but yields and revenues are lower,
compared to a simulated non-reserve counterfactual. These results support ex
ante empirical findings from the northern California urchin fishery and ex post
empirical findings in the Gulf of Mexico. In future work, we intend to refine our
economic analysis and calibration methods to improve the precision of our model
estimates.
124
Chapter 3. Do Marine Reserves Improve Fishery Outcomes?
Figure 3.1: Montly Average Price Trends
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Notes: This figure presents average prices for whole urchin landed in Santa Barbara, Oxnard,
and Ventura ports from June 2008 to December 2011. Prices generally peak between September
and December, reflecting high gonad mass and quality during these months.
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Figure 3.2: Landings by Port
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Notes: This figure presents annual yields from 1978-2011 reported in Santa Barbra, Oxnard,
and Ventura. The data series are not stacked.
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Figure 3.3: Fishery Trends
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Notes: This figure presents annual fishery trends including number of divers, number of trips,
yields, and average unit price. The red dashed line indicates the year of marine reserve
implementation.
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Figure 3.4: Nested Fishing Decision
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Figure 3.5: Santa Barbara Area Urchin Fishery
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Figure 3.6: Biological Model Patches
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Figure 3.7: Observed vs. Simulated Yield
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Notes: This figure presents observed monthly yields (black) and simulated monthly yields using
predicted trips from the fishing behavior model (green). The data run from January 2000 (month
1) to June 2011 (month 138). Marine reserves are implemented in April 2003 (month 40).
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Figure 3.8: Yield Residuals
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Notes: This figure presents monthly yield residuals from January 2000-June 2011. Marine
reserves are implemented in April 2003 (month 40).
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Figure 3.9: Yield Results
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Notes: This figure presents observed annual yields (black) and simulated annual yields in the
counterfactual no-reserve scenario (blue).
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Figure 3.10: Revenue Results
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Notes: This figure presents observed annual revenues (black) and simulated annual revenues in
the counterfactual no-reserve scenario (blue).
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Figure 3.11: Biomass Results
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Notes: This figure presents simulated mean annual biomass with observed trips (magenta) and
in the counterfactual no-reserve scenario (blue).
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Table 3.1: Santa Barbara Area Red Sea Urchin Fishery Management Timeline
Year Event
1971 Commercial fishery begins.
1984 State Legislature authorizes a required permit for fishing in the
urchin fishery but does not limit entry.
1987 The Fish and Game Commission places a moratorium on the
issuance of new permits.
1988 76 mm minimum size limit established. Temporal closures estab-
lished. Fishery is closed the entire first full week of the month from
May to September.
1989 Restricted access program begins. Temporal closures revised so
that fishery is closed the entire second full week of the month from
May to September.
1990 Effort reduction program introduced that currently requires 10
permits to be retired for each new entrant to reach a goal of 300
divers statewide. Temporal closures revised so that the fishery is
closed Friday-Sunday and the entire second full week of the month
from May to September.
1992 Temporal closures revised so that the fishery is closed Friday-
Sunday in April, May, September, and October; Thursday-Sunday
in June and August; Wednesday-Sunday in July; and the entire
second week in May-September. Minimum size limit increased to
83mm. Annual landing requirement (20 landings of 300 pounds
each in one of the two immediately preceding permit years) for
renewal of the permit (repealed in 2004).
2003 Temporal closures revised to eliminate the closure during second
full week from May-September. Channel Islands Marine Protected
Areas Network established.
2008 Temporal closures revised so that the fishery is closed Friday,
Saturday, and Sunday from June through October.
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Table 3.2: Diver Trends
Patches Fished Trips
Year Divers Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
2000 209 5.02 3.06 1 15 24.57 21.93 1 95
2001 167 4.74 2.75 1 12 22.62 20.33 1 84
2002 171 5.04 2.62 1 11 28.20 24.43 1 118
2003 167 5.73 2.97 1 12 36.99 30.71 1 138
2004 146 5.73 2.77 1 14 43.95 31.40 1 135
2005 144 5.46 2.89 1 14 43.03 30.72 1 117
2006 133 5.91 2.87 1 13 45.04 30.08 1 124
2007 132 5.48 2.59 1 13 41.87 30.82 1 121
2008 129 5.22 2.87 1 12 32.26 27.38 1 128
2009 119 5.56 2.75 1 13 40.89 33.27 1 154
2010 110 5.86 3.45 1 16 44.65 34.54 1 142
2011 108 6.16 3.02 1 16 44.48 34.17 1 145
Table 3.3: Trips by Day of the Week
Day Trips %
Monday 10,990 18.29
Tuesday 16,258 27.06
Wednesday 12,708 21.15
Thursday 11,588 19.29
Friday 3,615 6.02
Saturday 2,255 3.75
Sunday 2,668 4.44
Total 60,082
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Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Wind speed (m/sec) 3,032 7.38 3.53 0.74 17.19
Wave height (m) 3,032 2.18 0.83 0.44 7.68
Wave period (sec) 3,032 11.90 3.04 3.69 22.08
Distance (km) 66 61.09 29.24 3.65 127.09
Expected revenue (2011$) 66,704 691.99 390.54 0 3,266.54
Kelp area (ha) 3,036 115.06 207.36 0 2,083.77
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Table 3.5: Model Parameters
Symbol Description Value Source
P Number of patches 32 This study
amax Maximum age (months) 600 CNRA 2009
L∞ Terminal size (cm) 11 Rassweiler et al. 2012
k Growth rate (month−1) 0.0183 Rassweiler et al. 2012
α Length-weight coefficient (cm, lbs) 0.00149 Rassweiler et al. 2012
β Length-weight exponent 2.68 Rassweiler et al. 2012
m Natural mortality rate 0.0067 Rassweiler et al. 2012
LMSL Minimum size limit (cm) 8.3 CDFW regulations
Lmat Length at maturity (cm) 6.0 Rassweiler et al. 2012
γ Fecundity coefficient 16.82 Campbell et al. 1999
δ Fecundity exponent 3.27 Campbell et al. 1999
D Larval dispersal matrix On request Based on Mitarai et al. 2009
η 1st Beverton-Holt parameter 3.37E-5 This study
νj 2nd Beverton-Holt parameter 1.90E-12 -
9.96E-10
This study
q0 Pre-reserves catchability coefficient 2.56E-4 This study
q1 Post-reserves catchability coefficient 3.89E-4 This study
φ Post-reserves catchability time trend 1.85E-5 This study
Notes: Fecundity parameters are based on length in mm, which was accounted for in model
calculations.
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Table 3.6: Nested Logit Estimates
(1)
Constant 0.230∗∗∗
(0.063)
Choice-specific
Wind speed -0.070∗∗∗
(0.002)
Wave height -0.645∗∗∗
(0.007)
Wave period -0.024∗∗∗
(0.002)
Weekend -0.807∗∗∗
(0.013)
Alternative-specific
Distance -0.0012∗∗∗
(0.0004)
Expected revenue (’00s) 0.0094∗∗∗
(0.0030)
Kelp (’00s) 0.0073∗∗∗
(0.0023)
θ 0.047∗∗∗
(0.063)
Observations 9,995,570
Cases 434,590
Log-likelihood -334,543
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.1: Fisheries in the Analysis
Fishery Species/ Catch Shares
Management Plan Species Complex Management Area Adoption Year
BSAI Groundfish Pollock BS 1999
BSAI Groundfish Pollock AI
BSAI Groundfish Pollock Bogoslof
BSAI Groundfish Pacific cod BSAI
BSAI Groundfish Atka mackerel Eastern AI/BS 2008
BSAI Groundfish Atka mackerel Central AI 2008
BSAI Groundfish Atka mackerel Western AI 2008
BSAI Groundfish Yellowfin sole BSAI 2008
BSAI Groundfish Rock sole BSAI 2008
BSAI Groundfish Greenland turbot BS
BSAI Groundfish Greenland turbot AI
BSAI Groundfish Arrowtooth flounder BSAI
BSAI Groundfish Flathead sole BSAI 2008
BSAI Groundfish Other flatfish BSAI
BSAI Groundfish Pacific ocean perch BS
BSAI Groundfish Pacific ocean perch Eastern AI 2008
BSAI Groundfish Pacific ocean perch Central AI 2008
BSAI Groundfish Pacific ocean perch Western AI 2008
BSAI Groundfish Other rockfish BS
BSAI Groundfish Other rockfish AI
GOA Groundfish Pollock Shumagin
GOA Groundfish Pollock Chirikof
GOA Groundfish Pollock Kodiak
GOA Groundfish Pollock Eastern GOA
GOA Groundfish Pacific cod Western GOA
GOA Groundfish Pacific cod Central GOA
GOA Groundfish Pacific cod Eastern GOA
GOA Groundfish Shallow-water flatfish Western GOA
GOA Groundfish Shallow-water flatfish Central GOA
GOA Groundfish Shallow-water flatfish Eastern GOA
GOA Groundfish Deep-water flatfish Western GOA
GOA Groundfish Deep-water flatfish Central GOA
GOA Groundfish Deep-water flatfish Eastern GOA
GOA Groundfish Rex sole Western GOA
GOA Groundfish Rex sole Central GOA
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – Continued from previous page
Fishery Species/ Catch Shares
Management Plan Species Complex Management Area Adoption Year
GOA Groundfish Rex sole Eastern GOA
GOA Groundfish Arrowtooth flounder Western GOA
GOA Groundfish Arrowtooth flounder Central GOA
GOA Groundfish Arrowtooth flounder Eastern GOA
GOA Groundfish Flathead sole Western GOA
GOA Groundfish Flathead sole Central GOA
GOA Groundfish Flathead sole Eastern GOA
GOA Groundfish Pacific ocean perch Western GOA
GOA Groundfish Pacific ocean perch Central GOA 2007
GOA Groundfish Pacific ocean perch Eastern GOA
GOA Groundfish Northern rockfish Western GOA
GOA Groundfish Northern rockfish Central GOA 2007
GOA Groundfish Shortraker and rougheye rockfish Western GOA
GOA Groundfish Shortraker and rougheye rockfish Central GOA
GOA Groundfish Shortraker and rougheye rockfish Eastern GOA
GOA Groundfish Pelagic-shelf rockfish Western GOA
GOA Groundfish Pelagic-shelf rockfish Central GOA 2007
GOA Groundfish Pelagic-shelf rockfish Eastern GOA
GOA Groundfish Demersal shelf rockfish Southeast Outside
GOA Groundfish Thornyhead rockfish Western GOA
GOA Groundfish Thornyhead rockfish Central GOA
GOA Groundfish Thornyhead rockfish Eastern GOA
GOA Groundfish Other rockfish Western GOA
GOA Groundfish Other rockfish Central GOA
GOA Groundfish Other rockfish Eastern GOA
GOA Groundfish Atka mackerel GOA
BSAI Crab Red king crab Bristol Bay 2005
BSAI Crab Snow crab BS 2005
BSAI Crab Tanner crab BS 2005
BSAI Crab Red and blue king crab Pribolif Islands 2005
BSAI Crab Blue king crab St. Matthew Island 2005
BSAI Crab Red king crab Norton Sound
BSAI Crab Golden king crab Pribolif Islands
Total 68 18
Notes: In both groundfish FMPs, the sablefish and “other species” fisheries were excluded from the
analysis. In the GOA Groundfish FMP, the skate fisheries were excluded from the analysis due to lack of
available data. In the BSAI Groundfish FMP, northern, rougheye, and shortraker rockfish fisheries were
excluded from the analysis because their management area designations have evolved in a way that
makes them impossible to track in a consistent way across time. In the Crab FMP, the Western Aleutian
Islands red king crab, Eastern Aleutian Islands golden king crab, and Western Aleutian Islands golden
king crab fisheries were excluded from the analysis due to lack of available data. Fisheries are reported
using 1996 as a base year. In cases where area designations have become more disaggregated over time,
all variables have been aggregated to the baseline area delineations with the following exception.
Thornyhead rockfish was managed as a single fishery in the Gulf of Alaska until 1998, and area-specific
variables for 1996 and 1997 were approximated using weights established from 1998-2002 data.
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Table A.2: Fisheries Group Variable Definition
Group
ID Fisheries Rationale
Bristol Bay red king crab
Bering Sea snow crab
1 Bering Sea Tanner crab Rationalized crab fisheries
Pribilof Islands red and blue king crab
St. Matthew Island blue king crab
2 Pribilof Islands golden king crab Longline pot gear; low utilization
3 Norton Sound red king crab Small vessel fleet by regulation
4 Bering Sea pollock Rationalized pollock fishery
5 Aleutian Islands pollock Catch allocated to Aleut Corporation
6 Bogoslof pollock Incidental catch only
7 BSAI Pacific cod Multiple sectors; main target of freezer
longline and non-AFA trawl fleets
BSAI yellowfin sole
BSAI rock sole
BSAI flathead sole
8 Eastern AI/Bering Sea Atka mackerel Amendment 80 fisheries
Central AI Atka mackerel
Western AI Atka mackerel
Eastern AI Pacific ocean perch
Central AI Pacific ocean perch
Western AI Pacific ocean perch
9 Bering Sea Greenland turbot Amendment 80 and freezer
AI Greenland turbot longline fleet target fisheries
Bering Sea Pacific ocean perch
10 BSAI Arrowtooth Flounder Non-rationalized fisheries caught by
BSAI Other flatfish Amendment 80 fleet
Aleutian Islands Other Rockfish
Bering Sea Other Rockfish
Shumagin pollock
Western GOA shallow-water flatfish
Western GOA deep-water flatfish
Western GOA rex sole
Western GOA arrowtooth flounder
11 Western GOA flathead sole Western GOA trawl fleet fisheries
Western GOA Pacific ocean perch
Western GOA northern rockfish
Western GOA shortraker/rougheye rockfish
Western GOA pelagic-shelf rockfish
Western GOA thornyhead rockfish
Western GOA other rockfish
Chirikof Pollock
Kodiak Pollock
Central GOA shallow-water flatfish
Central GOA deep-water flatfish
12 Central GOA rex sole Central GOA trawl fleet
Central GOA arrowtooth flounder non-rationalized fisheries
Central GOA flathead sole
Central GOA shortraker/rougheye rockfish
Central GOA thornyhead rockfish
Central GOA other rockfish
Eastern GOA pollock
Eastern GOA shallow-water flatfish
Eastern GOA deep-water flatfish
Eastern GOA rex sole
Eastern GOA arrowtooth flounder
Continued on next page
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Table A.2 – Continued from previous page
Group ID Fisheries Rationale
13 Eastern GOA flathead sole Eastern GOA fisheries
Eastern GOA Pacific ocean perch
Eastern GOA shortraker/rougheye rockfish
Eastern GOA pelagic-shelf rockfish
Eastern GOA thornyhead rockfish
Eastern GOA other rockfish
Western GOA Pacific cod Multiple sectors; main target of freezer
14 Central GOA Pacific cod longline and non-AFA trawl fleets
Eastern GOA Pacific cod
15 Southeast Outside GOA demersal shelf rockfish Management delegated to State of Alaska
16 GOA Atka mackerel Incidental catch only
Central GOA pelagic-shelf rockfish Central GOA rockfish cooperatives
17 Central GOA Pacific ocean perch primary species
Central GOA northern rockfish
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Figure B.1: Observed vs. Predicted Trips
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Notes: This figure presents observed trips (black) and predicted monthly trips from the fishing
behavior model (green). The data run from January 2000 (month 1) to June 2011 (month 138).
Marine reserves are implemented in April 2003 (month 40).
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Figure B.2: Trip Residuals
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Notes: This figure presents monthly trips residuals from January 2000-June 2011. Marine
reserves are implemented in April 2003 (month 40).
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Figure B.3: Patch-level Trips
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Notes: This figure presents observed patch-level trips (black) and predicted patch-level trips
from the fishing behavior model (green). Marine reserves are implemented in April 2003 (month
40). Patches 25, 31, and 32 are reserve patches.
162
Appendix B. Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1.1 Fishing Behavior Dataset
Fish Ticket Data
Fish ticket data come from the California Department of Fish and Wildlife Commercial Landings Receipt
Database, which contains individual records of statewide urchin landings from 1977 to present. Fish ticket
information includes date and port of landing, diver identification number, vessel identification number, buyer
identification number, catch, unit price, and CDFW statistical reporting block where the fish were caught. To
arrive at our 60,082 trip sample, we restrict the data to fish tickets recorded between January 2000 and June 2011
(the last month for which we have kelp data and six months prior to implementation of new mainland marine
reserves under the California Marine Life Protection Act) at the ports of Santa Barbara, Oxnard, and Ventura.
We drop observations for CDFW statistical reporting blocks outside our choice set (<1% of observations),
observations missing vessel ID, diver ID, catch, or price data (<0.1% of total observations), observations recorded
on days the fishery was closed to commercial fishing (<0.3% of total observations), and observations for divers
that reported fewer than 10 fish tickets during the sample period (<0.5% of total observations).
Finally, we address the issue of multiple fish tickets recorded for the same diver on the same day (ap-
proximately 8% of remaining observations). For the 85% of multiple fish ticket cases that result from divers
either selling catch to multiple buyers or from fishing in adjacent CDFW blocks aggregated to a single location
alternative in our dataset, we aggregate the fish tickets by summing recorded catches and taking the catch-
weighted average of prices. For the remaining 15% of multiple diver-day fish tickets that result from divers
fishing in multiple fishing location alternatives, we retain the fish ticket with the highest catch. In many cases,
this serves to eliminate observations of within-trip search behavior wherein a diver conducts a test dive at a
particular location, finds subpar abundance or quality and decides to fish in a different location.
A remaining issue in the fish ticket data is that some price data may be inaccurately reported. Because urchin
unit price is determined by the quality of the uni, which is not fully known until urchin have been processed, ex-
vessel prices recorded on fish tickets represent an estimate of the actual unit price ultimately awarded to divers.
There is some evidence that estimates of unit price are sometimes purposely under-reported. For example, fish
tickets for catch sold to three large buyers consistently report a price of $0.30, between 2004-2007 (compared to
an average unit price of $0.64 for catch sold to other buyers), affecting approximately one-third of fish tickets
reported in those years. A limited number of observations (48) report price as zero. Future work will attempt to
address and resolve these issues.
Participation and Port Assignment
To estimate the fishing behavior model, we must determine diver choice occasions and port location. For a
given diver, we determine fishery participation at an annual level. We deem a diver to be active in the fishery in a
given calendar year if he reports at least one fish ticket during the year. Conditional on fishery participation, we
also observe some limited port-switching behavior among divers. We assign active divers to ports at the monthly
level by assigning each diver to the port at which he recorded the majority of his fish tickets. If the diver does
not report a fish ticket during the month, we assign the diver to the port at which he last reported a fish ticket.
Expected Revenue
We use the 60,082 observation fish ticket dataset to construct monthly patch-level expected revenue. We
considered three expected revenue calculations. Our first approach is the product of a 30-day backward average
of patch-level prices and catches. Our second approach is the product of a 60-day backward average of patch-level
prices and catches. Our third approach is the product of a 90-day backward average of patch-level catches and a
30-day backward average of fishery-wide prices. In all three approaches, we faced a missing data problem resulting
from lightly fished patches in which 30- to 90-day backward averages could not be constructed because no fish
tickets were observed in the relevant window. In these cases, we imputed missing data by filling missing values
with the first available previous value. Future work will develop a more robust method for determining expected
revenue by either refining our current imputation methods or using a regression approach to determine expected
revenue. Our preferred specification (determined from comparison of AIC and BIC values for the competing
models) uses the third approach.
Weather Data
We collect hourly weather data on wind speed, significant wave height, dominant wave period, and mean
wave direction from the National Data Buoy Center. Wind speed is measured in meters per second averaged over
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an eight-minute period. Significant wave height, measured in meters, is calculated as the average of the highest
one-third of all of the wave heights during the 20-minute sampling period. Dominant wave period, measured
in seconds, is the period with the maximum wave energy. Mean wave direction is the direction from which the
waves at the dominant period are coming. The units are degrees from true north, increasing clockwise, with
north as 0 degrees and East as 90 degrees. Our primary weather dataset comes from the West Santa Barbara
buoy (Station 46054) located 38 nautical miles northwest of Santa Barbara (34.265 N 120.477 W). Missing data
were imputed using data from the Harvest buoy (Station 46218; 34.458 N 120.782 W), the East Santa Barbara
buoy (Station 46053; 34.262 N 119.879 W), and the Point Arguello Station (Station PTGC1; 34.577 N 120.648
W). Future work will investigate incorporating wave direction into the fishing behavior model.
B.1.2 Methods for Estimating Initial Age-Structured Biomass
Production Model
A Stock-Production Model Incorporating Covariates (ASPIC) (ver. 5) software was used (Prager 1992, 1994,
2011) to estimate parameters of a non-equilibrium, generalized production model for the Santa Barbara Red Sea
Urchin stock using catch and CPUE data from 1978-2010. The generalized production model used by ASPIC is
described as:
Bt+1 = Bt +
r
p
Bt
(
1− B
p
t
K
)
− Ct (B.1)
where B is biomass at time t, K is the populationâĂŹs carrying capacity, r is the populationâĂŹs intrinsic
growth rate, and C is the catch at time t, and p is a shape parameter that describes the relationship of BMSY /K
(Prager 1992).
Annual CPUE is assumed to be proportional to biomass:
CPUEt = Btq (B.2)
where q is a catchability coefficient. To account for changes in CPUE that were not related to stock biomass
(i.e., changes in minimum size regulations), three catchability coefficients were estimated for the model for the
years 1978-1987, 1988-1991, and 1992-2010.
The stock status at the start of the model (1978) was not known, so we allowed the model to estimate this
parameter. The best-fit model (based on AIC value) had an estimated carrying capacity K = 1.30x108 and
an estimated starting stock biomass B1978 that was equivalent to 70.1% of carrying capacity. We thought the
estimate of B1978 seemed reasonable as the fishery began in 1971, and when data collection began in 1978, the
fishery was likely lightly exploited. To determine how sensitive our estimate of K was to this assumption we ran
the model with a range of initial stock status parameter values and found our starting biomass parameter had
no significant effect on our estimate of K.
The model was fit to annual CPUE data from 1978-2010. A sum of squares objective function was used
to provide maximum likelihood estimates and a lognormal distribution of residuals was assumed and verified.
Bias-corrected 90% confidence intervals were calculated for each estimated parameter from 1,000 bootstrap runs.
Estimate of Age-Structured Biomass
We assume that virgin stock biomass is equal to the stock’s carrying capacity (B0 = K). We run the age-
structured model described in Section 3.3.2 with a biomass of age 1 individuals that is equal to virgin recruitment
(R0) and a fishing mortality of zero until equilibrium is reached at the stock’s estimated K.1 The age-structured
population in February (month of recruitment) at K is assumed to equal the age-structured virgin biomass of
the stock prior to the fishery (1970).
We solve for a constant instantaneous fishing mortality rate F that when applied to all vulnerable age
classes, brings the stock from K to equilibrium at the starting stock biomass estimated by the ASPIC model
(B1978 = 0.71K). The age-structure of the stock at equilibrium with this estimated constant F is the assumed
age-structure of our stock in 1978.
1Virgin recruitment R0 is equal to the ratio of B0, which is estimated by the production
model, to biomass per recruit BPR, which is calculated using parameter estimates from the
metapopulation model.
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Monthly spatial catch data is used to estimate the F in every patch for each month from 1978-2010 (Haddon
2001):
hp,t =
Cp,t
Bp,t
(B.3)
Where C is catch in patch p at time t and h is the harvest rate in patch p at time t. Fishing mortality (F )
in each patch p, at time t is then calculated as:
Fp,t = −lnâĄą(1− hp,t) (B.4)
We apply F in every patch for each month from 1978-1999 in our age-structured model to arrive at our
assumed age-structured starting biomass for 2000.
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